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Access, Progress, and Fairness:
Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright
Nicolas Suzor*
ABSTRACT

This Article provides a detailed critique of the incentives-access
binary in copyright discourse. Mainstream copyright theory generally
accepts that copyright is a balance between providing incentives to
authors to invest in the production of cultural works and enhancing the
dissemination of those works to the public. This Article argues that
dominant copyright theory obscures the possibility of developing a
model of copyright that is able to support authors without necessarily
limiting access to creative works. The abundance that the Internet
allows suggests that increasing access to cultural works to enhance
learning, sharing, and creative play should be a fundamental goal of
copyright policy.

This Article examines models of supporting and coordinating
cultural production without exclusivity, including crowd/unding, tips,
levies, restitution, and service-based models. In their current forms,
each of these models fails to provide a cohesive and convincing vision of
the two main functions of copyright: instrumentality (how cultural
production can be funded) and fairness (how authors can be
adequately rewarded). This Article provides three avenues for future
research to investigate the viability of alternatecopyright models: (1) a
better theory of fairness in copyright rewards; (2) more empirical study
of commons models of cultural production; and (3) a critical
examination of the noneconomic harm-limiting function that
exclusivity in copyright provides.

* 2012 Nicolas Suzor. Senior Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology.
Thanks to Derek Bambauer, Kylie Pappalardo, Robert Cunningham, Brian Fitzgerald, Peter Yu,
and participants at the Drake Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable for comments on drafts
of this paper.
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In an age of cheap digital distribution, radical copyright
critiques have emerged that challenge the basic assumptions of
copyright law. The standard justification for copyright is that it is a
utilitarian balance between providing incentives to the creative
industries' to invest in cultural production on the one hand, and
encouraging access to and use of those works on the other. Copyright
does this by providing exclusive rights over expression in order to
allow copyright owners to recoup their costs of production. Radical
critiques, which this Article calls "abundance models," challenge this
See generally STUART CUNNINGHAM, WHAT PRICE A CREATIVE ECONOMY? 1-50 (2006)
1.
(discussing the term "creative industries").
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standard justification by envisaging models of copyright not rooted in
scarcity of copyrighted goods. These models instead suggest methods
of funding cultural production of creative works through public levy
systems; 2 business models based on services, cross-subsidies, and
advertising; 3 tips and crowdfunding agreements; 4 and profit-sharing
obligations on commercial users.5
These models generally fall outside of the mainstream
copyright-reform debate, whose bounds are set by utilitarianism and
authors-rights theories, the two main theories underlying copyright
law.6 This Article argues that the dichotomous opposition of these two
theories masks a deeply ingrained assumption in copyright law that is
common to both: exclusivity is necessary to provide the incentives and
rewards to authors that "Progress" 7 requires. Exclusivity creates a
market that satisfies both theoretical approaches by (1) incentivizing
authors and producers to invest in the most valuable cultural
production and (2) rewarding authors in proportion to the worth of
their work. Importantly, copyright is not ideologically pure.8 An
exclusive market fulfills both instrumental and deontological
functions by equating incentives with fair rewards.9 The abundance
models have not found normative support in part because they break
the link between incentives and rewards.
The Internet's potential to reconfigure established modes of
production and distribution raises questions about the assumed
necessity of exclusivity. To challenge this assumption, this Article
proposes viewing creativity as ordinary and abundant and
emphasizing the importance of access to creative expression in order
to enable individuals to learn, grow, share, and engage in creative

2.

See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES

TO KEEP 199-258

(2004);

Peter

Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The MirrorImage of Digital Copyright?, 18 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 85, 92-94 (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free
Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 80-83 (2003).
3.

See, e.g., CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 20-33 (2009).

4.
See Paul Harrison, The Rational Street Performer Protocol, PAUL HARRISON,
http://www.logarithmic.net/pfh/rspp (last updated Nov. 25, 2002); John Kelsey & Bruce Schneier,
The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copyrights, FIRST MONDAY (June 1999), http://www.
firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/673/583; Chris Rasch, The Wall
Street Performer Protocol: Using Software Completion Bonds to Fund Open Source Software
Development, FIRST MONDAY (June 4, 2001), http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/865/774.
5
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
RestitutionaryImpulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 260-61 (1992).
Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
6.
1151, 1158 (2007).
7.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1154-55.
8.
Id. at 1158.
9.
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play.1 0 Prioritizing access provides a starting point to investigate
whether and how society can realize copyright's instrumental and

deontological functions without exclusivity. If creativity really is
abundant, then a copyright model that supports cultural production
without necessarily limiting access could represent a more efficient,
more distributively fair, more empowering, and more innovative
culture than the zero-sum view of culture entrenched in the
incentives-access paradigm."
To consider potential alternatives to exclusivity, this Article
moves beyond the opposition of utilitarian and authors' rights
theories. More critically examining the claims of each is necessary in
order to better understand how to economically support cultural
production and simultaneously reward authors fairly. This Article
outlines some of the weaknesses of current abundance models in
copyright in order to uncover the theoretical tensions that constrain
their development.
First, proponents of abundance models need to develop a better
theory of fairness in order to understand the rewards to which
creative producers are morally entitled. If abundance models are to
gain normative acceptance, proponents must build consensus as to
when uncompensated access, or free riding, is unfair. Separating
fairness from efficiency is important in order to identify when
uncompensated access can be appropriate, and when either exclusivity
or an obligation to pay for access may be necessary to prevent
exploitation of authors.
Second, scholars should conduct more empirical research to
examine the extent to which abundance models are practically feasible
across various creative industries. Classical economic theory explains
that copyright is necessary to induce consumers to pay for access to
expressive works, but many non-scarce models rely on the voluntary
A new research model should
financial support of consumers.
investigate the factors that influence actors to support creative
production beyond exclusivity and whether that level of support could
sufficiently fund a diverse range of productions at varying degrees of
This Article suggests that viewing these models as
expense.
collaborative action problems will assist in building an empirical base
for understanding cultural-production processes that do not rely on
public provision or the exclusive market.12
10.
See id. at 1154, 1190-205 (articulating a model of progress based on decentering
creativity).
11.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 492-98 (1996) (describing the "incentives-access paradigm").
12.

See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS

FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 25 (1990); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the
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Third, any new model must appropriately deal with the other
interests that copyright currently supports, beyond the instrumental
goal of encouraging "Progress." The most obvious of these are the
moral rights of creators, which are currently partially protected by
copyright's exclusive rights in the United States. 13 Copyright owners
can also use (and misuse) copyright to protect other interests,
however, including reputation and privacy. Abundance models that
aim to reduce exclusivity must determine whether protection for these
other interests of authors and copyright owners should accordingly
increase. The first step in this process requires developing a better
understanding of whether these noneconomic harms are wholly
subjective and heterogeneous, such that only exclusivity can protect
them, or whether they are adequately protectable through other
means.
Part I of this Article examines how the orthodox justifications
for copyright work to entrench the incentives-access paradigm in a
way that systematically prefers incentives to access. Part II draws on
the recent literature to sketch a reconstituted view of progress that
emphasizes the importance of access for knowledge, entertainment,
In Parts III-VI, this Article
self-expression, and cultural play.
explores these three initial research avenues in order to more fully
understand the viability of potential abundance models for copyright.
I. THE ENTRENCHED INCENTIVES-ACCESS PARADIGM
The current copyright debate revolves around the fundamental,
but assumed, necessity of exclusivity in copyright law. The major
copyright struggle centers on the widening gap between doctrine and
social norms concerning copying. 14 Both sides of the mainstream
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 675-96 (2010) (adopting the Institutional
Analysis and Development framework for cultural production processes).
13.
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 30-35 (2010).
14.

WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 109 (2009); see Jane C.

&

Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 61 (2002)
(arguing that "greed," of both copyright owners and consumers, has directly contributed to the
poor public perception of copyright law); Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L.
[that] is
ARTS 1, 2 (2005) (arguing that the public perception of copyright as "a juggernaut ...
crushing cherished creative and expressive freedoms" must be rejected and addressed through
public education); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 (2010)
("Copyright laws that make reading, listening, and viewing more difficult are problematic . . . [in
part because] the sheer pointlessness of some of these restraints has undermined the perceived
legitimacy of the U.S. copyright system."); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 538 (discussing "the vast disparity
between copyright law and copyright norms"); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with the Intellectual
Property Laws: A PsychologicalPerspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 224 (1996) ("The
effectiveness of intellectual property law is . . . heavily dependent on gaining voluntary
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debate agree that reform is necessary to restore public faith in
copyright, but disagree on the means. Copyright industry groups
attempt to educate consumers that piracy is morally wrong and push
for stronger rights, more distributed enforcement, and more pervasive
information control. 15 More moderate copyright commentators, on the
other hand, converge on two points: (1) Congress should curtail the
most egregious effects of copyright law to provide a better balance
between the rights of users and owners and greatly simplify the law to
make it more understandable;"6 and (2) business models should
continue to evolve to provide consumers with a simpler and more
efficient alternative to infringement.17 Because both sides share the
assumption that exclusivity is necessary, the debate marginalizes the
promise that abundance models provide.
A. The Mainstream Copyright Debate
The two most visible sides to the debate agree on one central
point: copyright law must provide a balance between the rights
granted to authors and producers and the public's interest in
accessing expressive works.18 As copyright reform movements begin
to converge, the best we can aim for under a copyright theory that
relies on a dichotomy between incentives and access is to develop a
system that is "leaky" enough to mitigate the most harmful effects of
scarcity, yet strong enough to encourage producers to invest in

cooperation with the law. As a result, it is necessary to influence what people want to do in
situations in which there is little or no threat of immediate punishment for wrongdoing."
(emphasis added)); Francis Gurry, Dir. Gen., World Intellectual Prop. Org., The Blue Sky
Conference: Future Directions in Copyright Law (Feb. 25, 2011), in http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/dgo/speeches/dg-blueskyconfl.html (arguing that it is necessary to "effect a change in
attitude" to the way that "that most people see or hear about copyright and the Internet").
See PATRY, supra note 14, at 94-96; Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed
15.
Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (2006) ("Entertainment industry representatives have
deployed a variety of rhetorical tropes designed to position online copyright infringement, and
particularly p2p filesharing, as morally objectionable and socially insidious.").
16.
See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,
51-52 (1994); Real Copyright Reform, supra note 14, at 33-34 (arguing that there is "no excuse"
for the complexity of copyright law); Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project:
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176, 1181 (2010) ("A well-functioning
copyright law carefully balances the interests of the public [and] . . . copyright
owners ... [and] ... should embody rules that are clear and sensible, yet flexible enough to apply
in a changing environment.").
17.
See Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 1,
66 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (quoting an industry representative as saying industries will
"isolate the forms of piracy that compete with legitimate sales, treat those as a proxy for unmet
consumer demand, and then find a way to meet that demand" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
18.
See Netanel, supra note 2, at 24.
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copyright products.19 This debate leaves the core assumption-that
copyright is a balance between providing incentives to authors and the
interests of the public at large-mostly unexamined. 20
The orthodox view of copyright in Anglo-American discourse is
that copyright provides the incentives necessary to encourage authors
to create. 21 Copyright, under this view, is a necessary evil, a finely
tuned balance between providing incentives to create and encouraging
dissemination of, and access to, copyright works. 22 This balance,
however, is fundamentally indeterminate-it is unclear what balance
between incentives and access is optimal. 23 There is also deep
uncertainty at the root of the utilitarian equation as to whether it
makes sense to talk about incentives for creative labor at all; it is
becoming increasingly clear that the financial rewards copyright
provides may have very little role in stimulating creativity. 24 Recent
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
19.
PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 184 (2001) (arguing that "a leaky copyright

system works best"); see Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright
Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649, 673 (2007) ("To best serve its economic and social objectives (to
promote Progress, broadly conceived), copyright must be somewhat but not completely leaky.");
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 910 (2001) ("Even if some free riding slips
by, in the guise of civil disobedience or otherwise, the empirical evidence suggests that voluntary
compliance will likely prove sufficient to achieve a fair and efficient level of effective
protection.").
This assumption is furthered by:
20.
[C]reating the appearance of controversy, the struggle between maximalists and
minimalists sustains the underlying hegemony of the instrumentalist paradigm. As
much as maximalists, minimalists deploy the concept of copyright as a way of
providing incentives for creativity. The debate is not about the appropriateness of that
concept but about the way in which it should be operationalized.
Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in Copyright Law,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2011).
See Real Copyright Reform, supra note 14, at 8-9.
21.
22.

CHARLES ROBERT GASTON, MACAULAY'S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN'S

ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 25 (1914) (reprinting Lord Macaulay's famous point that copyright
"is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers"); William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
23.

ROBERT P. MERGES,

JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2-3 (2011); Mark A.

Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1065-69 (2005);
David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2004); Ivan P.L. Png,
Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research, 3 REV. ECoN. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3, 4 (2006)
(arguing that insufficient empirical research exists on the appropriate balance in copyright law);
Ruth Towse et al., The Economics of Copyright Law: A Stocktake of the Literature, 5 REV. EcoN.
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 15-16 (2008) ("There is nothing in all the literature we surveyed
here to guide us towards the 'optimal' copyright standard.").
24.

BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967) ("[Clopyright has

apparatus of
evidently more to do today with mobilizing the profit-propelled
dissemination-publication and distribution-than with calling the signals into first
unpublished existence; the latter process must be to a considerable extent self-generated."); Julie
E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-IndustrialEconomy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WiS.
L. REV. 141, 143; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine
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critical examinations of creative processes highlight the importance of

compulsion, inspiration, serendipity, need, and desire, rather than
copyright or even financial gain, as key motivating factors for most
creative labor. 25 At the same time, the lottery that copyright provides,
rewarding an extremely small proportion of artists highly, suggests
that copyright creates severe distributional problems and has serious
failures in its inability, in practical terms, to provide the financial
support that professional creators need to pursue their craft. 26
Certainly, copyright has a very real instrumental function in
allocating capital: facilitating the coordination of expensive cultural
and
distribution,
production and the selection, marketing,
maintenance of works. But these functions may be substantially more
limited than the standard incentives-access paradigm holds. 2 7
B. The Entrenchment of Exclusivity
The fundamental validity of the incentives-access dichotomy
has "ascended to the status of an article of faith in the absence of any
empirical validation." 28 This assumption that "progress" is best
furthered by exclusivity and a functioning market is firmly embedded

That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 29, 42-48 (2011); see Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic
Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and
Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 800 (2006); Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual
Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1722 (2009); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant:
Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY (Aug.
2,
1999),
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view Article/684/594; Raymond
Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of
Copyright's Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1719 (2009); Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual
Property: Inspired Beginnings and "Work-Makes-Work," Two Stages in the Creative Processes of
Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2113 (2011); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996).
25.
Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441,
1483 (2010); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1970 (2005); Silbey, supra note 24, at 2102;
Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 513, 522-36- (2009).
RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE, AND REWARD: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
26.
COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 132-36 (2001) (arguing that copyright

supports an asymmetry in market power between professional artists and publisher
intermediaries and generally fails to adequately reward all but superstar artists). The problem is
exacerbated because the likelihood of success in the market is unpredictable at best. See
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 573, 616 (2010); Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The
Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 383-84 (2008); Litman, supra note 14, at 9-10; Tushnet, supra
note 25, at 518; Zimmerman, supra note 24, at 41.
27.
See Cohen, supra note 24, at 153-56.
28
Litman, supra note 14, at 29.
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Given the
in the constitutional justification for copyright.2 9
indeterminacy of the utilitarian thesis, however, particularly in the
context of great technological advances that substantially lower
creation and distribution costs, its continuing uncritical acceptance
should be surprising. 0 Partly, this is due to inertia-given copyright's
entrenched foundation, it is difficult to see any real alternatives. 31
The political strength of copyright industries supports this inertia, as
the industries have successfully argued that a copyright policy that is
best for the publishers and producers must be best for both authors
In part, however, rights-based theoretical
and the public. 32
justifications also supplement this faith in the incentives-access
dichotomy, because while they are often officially disclaimed,
rights-based theories provide a natural justification to authors'
exclusive rights through the labor or personality of the author. 3 3
Rights-based theories rely on a deontological proposition that
interfering with a creator's plans for the object of her labor or creative
Margaret Chon, Postrnodern "Progress"- Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
29.
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 98 (1993) ("[B]ecause of the instrumental tone of the Copyright
and Patent Clause ('to promote the Progress . . . by securing'), no one truly disputes that such
'Progress' is to be encouraged through the frankly instrumental use of laws." (emphasis added)).
30.
See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305-07 (2002); Paul Romer, When
Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 213, 215 (2002) (explaining that
because digital copies have an extremely low marginal cost, copyright has the effect of imposing
an extremely large commodity tax, which is unlikely to be efficient).
See the often-quoted passage from a review of the US patent system:
31.
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But
since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (1958).

See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-70 (2006) (explaining that entrenched
32.
power and political compromise, rather than theory, predominantly shape copyright legislation);
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 381-82 (Craig
Joyce ed., 2009); see also BENEDICT ATKINSON, THE TRUE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT: THE

AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 1905-2005 (2007) (arguing that the development of copyright law in
Britain and Australia was based more on natural rights theory and sectional interests than
orthodoxical utilitarian balancing); Sterk, supra note 24, at 1244-46.
33.
MERGES, supra note 23, at 9-10; Bambauer, supra note 26, at 353-54; McGowan,
supra note 23, at 36-38; Jean-Luc Piotraut, Author's Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness
and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 556-57
(2006) ("[B]oth natural law principles and economic policy decisions motivated copyright law
development in the United States. . . . Decidedly, authors' personal claims as well as an economic
argument underlay both French and American copyright laws." (emphasis added)). Samuelson
notes that:
[M]any members of the public, and certainly most creators, are likely to have a dose of
"natural rights" theory in their perception about copyright law, under which authors
would have at least some control over the use of their works even if the use is
non-commercial-and especially when the use is commercial.
Samuelson, supra note 16, at 1213.
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While rights-based
expression can cause her intrinsic harm. 34
arguments have strong internal limits that ensure that third parties
have sufficient autonomy to create, the complexities of these limits are
often lost in mainstream copyright discourse. 35 It follows, for common
authors-rights arguments, that authors are morally entitled to an
exclusive property right over their creations to prevent the harm that
occurs from nonconsensual interference with expression.
Since copyright doctrine in practice is not wholly utilitarian or
wholly rights-based, 36 the opposition of these two approaches provides
fertile grounds for arguments about the proper scope of copyright law.
Although the utilitarian and natural-rights justifications for copyright
are maintained in opposition, requiring exclusive property rights in
expression produces a result that is more or less acceptable to both.
Despite fundamental differences between the two approaches, their
mutual support for exclusive rights can be read either as a utilitarian
attempt to provide necessary incentives to creators, or as a recognition
of the rights of creators to the fruits of their labor or the
manifestations of their personal expression. 37 While the differences
matter at the margins-and they matter a great deal-they do not
matter for maintaining exclusivity, the core function of copyright. 38
That core of exclusivity has accordingly become deeply entrenched.
C. The Process-BasedApproach to "Progress"
Each of the orthodox arguments for exclusivity applies mainly
to particular subsets of the subject matter protected by copyright law.
Strictly speaking, economic approaches should not support exclusivity
for authors who would create without it.39 The two predominant
natural rights justifications are similarly limited, for different
reasons. Lockean approaches commit to a conception of creative labor
as difficult and painful toil,40 which suggests that copyright should

See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 23, at 9-10.
34.
Drassinower, supra note 20, at 1871 (arguing that we should further examine "the
35.
as yet largely unexplored potential of a rights-based minimalism"); see HUGH BREAKEY,
INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY (forthcoming 2012).

See McGowan, supra note 23, at 11.
36.
For the utilitarian perspective, see James A.D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That is
37.
the Software Copyright Question, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 251, 255-56 (1997). For the natural
justification, see Gordon, supra note 5, at 208-09.
Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3
38.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 59-60 (1988).
Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 31-32
39.
(2004).
40.
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 302-05
(1988); cf. Tushnet, supra note 25, at 525 ("Contrary to the Lockean vision of difficult labor,

2013]

ACCESS, PROGRESS, AND FAIRNESS

307

only reward production that is either labor-intensive or undertaken
with the expectation of reward.41 Personality theories, on the other
hand, protect only original works that embody the creative expression
of the author and to which the author feels a special connection,
rather than the more prosaic and fungible works that make up a large
proportion of copyright subject matter. 42
It would seem absurd for copyright law to actually attempt to
draw such distinctions in practice. Despite utilitarian and Lockean
theories, it would appear grossly unfair to allow exclusive rights only
for laborious economic production and not to the authors who create
out of passion or desire. 43 Similarly, regarding the personality
theories, it seems dangerously subjective to inquire whether an author
felt a particularly close bond to her work before awarding her some
form of exclusive control. It is only by reading all three of these
approaches together that copyright theory arrives at a fundamental
justification for exclusivity.
In order to avoid actually having to draw these distinctions in
doctrine, copyright takes a process-based approach that equates
incentives with reward and autonomy with control. 44 These theories
align through a conception of progress that constructs a paradigmatic
vision of the creative laborer as an individual author toiling for long
hours on a labor of love with the hope that, once it is completed, she
can sell it for a fair price, if she so chooses. 45 By viewing this
abstraction as an ideal form of creative production, copyright theory
constructs a generalizable approach that does not require the drawing
of difficult-and seemingly arbitrary-distinctions between similar
creative outputs on the basis of the author's time invested, motivation
for creation, or attachment to the final work. 4 6
This romantic view of creative expression fits into a larger
teleology of progress that prioritizes the continual professional
which people only do to avoid starving, engaging in creative labor is not a task in need of
external incentives.").
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
41.
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1547-48 (1993).
Hughes, supra note 40, at 337-41; Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood,
42.
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986-88 (1982) (drawing a distinction between personal and fungible
property).
Stan J. Liebowitz, Is Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
43.
1692, 1693 (2010) (arguing that a perfectly efficient copyright regime would not be fair because it
would deprive creators from a reward for their labor); see Sharing and Stealing, supra note 39.
44.
See Cohen, supra note 6.
See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship",
45.
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 468-71; Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:Economic and
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author', 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426
(1984).
46.
Cohen, supra note 6, at 1162.
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development of new, highly original, and highly valuable works. 47
Utilitarian theories attempt to find an objective method to ensure that
society directs investment in cultural production to the best (most
valuable) ends. 4 8 For rights theories, it is important that authors are
rewarded in proportion to the worth of the product.4 9 The utilitarian
and rights-based approaches align here when they share a view of
copyright's purpose as a value-neutral method of promoting progress
by providing a marketplace for expression.5 0 By seeking an efficient
competitive market in expression, utilitarian approaches are able to
assume that the total price a creator receives in the market reflects
her required incentive and the aggregate demand for the product.
For rights theories, the same meritocratic assumption works to
identify an author's just deserts: the total price a creator is able to
extract for a work reflects its social worth.5 1 A key attraction of the
conjunction of utilitarian and rights theories is the ability to further
progress while avoiding difficult judgments on the value of expression
by "retreat[ing] to a process-based vision of merit-based selection." 52
By equating merit with market value, this procedural approach
ensures both that the market rewards authors in proportion with their
talent and contribution 53 and that the market directs investment and
creative labor to the most valuable ends. 54 In essence, this approach
assumes the price an author can command is both the amount
required to incentivize her to create and the amount she deserves.5 5

47.
See Chon, supra note 29, at 114-22.
48.
See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information
Production, 22 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 81, 83 (2002); see generally Harold Demsetz, Information
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. EcON. 1 (1969).
49.
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1165.
See id.
50.
51.
See id.
52.
See id.; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52
(1903).
See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights
53
Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 512 (1998) (arguing that in some circumstances, copyright's
"merit-neutral stance is expressly intended to serve meritocratic as well as market ends").
54
See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293,
296 (1970) (discussing the role of excludability in ensuring that optimal levels of public goods are
produced); Lunney, Jr., supra note 11, at 489 ("From an allocative-efficiency perspective,
copyright provides the proper degree of protection when it ensures that individuals will produce
works of authorship if, and only if, such production would represent the most highly valued use
of their resources."); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 842, 856 (1992); see also Cohen, supranote
6, at 1200; Frischmann, supra note 19, at 658 (critiquing the proposition that "[i]nternalization is
the 'silver bullet' that aligns private and social welfare"); Lemley, supra note 23, at 1041
(critiquing the tendency in economic theory to favor full appropriation of social value in order to
maximize welfare).
55.
See Waldron, supranote 54, at 851-52.
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This dominant vision of progress goes a long way to explaining
The progress imperative
the assumed necessity of exclusivity.
requires a method of determining value in order to encourage and
reward the continual development of new, highly original, creative
works. Exclusivity allows a commodity market in expression, and the
market provides an objective method of valuing creative works. In
this context, abundance models that use purely economic arguments
to decouple incentives from exclusivity in copyright fail because they
break the link between incentives and reward. Economic theories
aimed at providing alternative answers to the public goods problem
seek to determine how authors can earn a reasonable return on
creative production, but unlike the commodity-market model, these
theories are unable to show that this return is also the amount that
authors deserve. 56
Rather than engage directly with both the utilitarian and
rights theories, mainstream copyright discourse suffers from a
problematic quest for ideological purity, which attempts to prove one
over the other.57 Because these theoretical justifications supposedly
cover the field of normative approaches, their opposition constrains
our thinking about the potential evolution of copyright law.5 8 The
unfortunate result is a lowest-common-denominator endorsement of
exclusivity that is able to satisfy both theories simultaneously, to the
detrinent of a richer understanding of the complex network of social
interactions through which creative expression flows.
II. THE IMPOVERISHED VIEW OF ACCESS IN THE COPYRIGHT BALANCE
Both utilitarian and rights theories require some form of
balance between the interests of authors in having exclusive rights
and the interests of the public in having access to expressive works.
This balance pits the authors' interests (incentives or rewards) against
the more inchoate interests of society (or users), and the balance
generally tips in favor of the more concrete authorial interests.5 9 As a

&

56
See Kenneth Einar Himma, The Justificationof Intellectual Property: Contemporary
PhilosophicalDisputes, 59 J. AM. Soc'Y FOR INFO. Sc. & TECH. 1143, 1152 (2008).
57
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1155.
See id. at 1158; see also John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User
58
Rights and the IP (Identity Politics)of IP (IntellectualProperty), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011)
("The existing polemic, which typically pits labor-desert and personhood interests against
utilitarian interests, does not, and should not, fully define the metes and bounds of the policy
discourse.").
See James Boyle, Essay, A Politics of Intellectual Property:Environmentalism for the
59
Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 95-97 (1997); see also MERGES, supra note 23, at 82-83 ("An
understanding of IP that embraces creator autonomy directs us to resolve close cases, those
where the costs and benefits of IP protections are in doubt, in favor of creators."); PATTERSON
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understand
commonly
accounts
theoretical
both
result,
uncompensated access, or free riding, to be normatively harmful.
A. The Impact of Limited Access on Users and Authors
From the utilitarian perspective, the balance metaphor
requires copyright policy to weigh the incentives provided to authors
(or publishers) against the deadweight losses that arise from raising
access prices above the minimum costs of distribution. This problem
is largely intractable within the incentives-access paradigm; as
Kenneth Arrow points out, "precisely to the extent that .

.

. [property

rights in information are] successful, there is an underutilization of
the information."6 0 If copyright incentives are necessary to produce
creative expression, and greater incentives lead to more production, 61
then reducing deadweight loss by decreasing copyright protection in
order to increase access necessarily means reducing production. 62 In
general terms, as long as copyright incentives are necessary, any
deadweight losses they produce are unavoidable. 63 If all users are

BIRCH, JR., supra note 32, at 235-36; Cohen, supra note 6, at 1196-97; Julie E. Cohen, The Place
of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 374 (2005). There are, of course, some
notable exceptions. See, e.g., CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.R 339 (Can.)
(treating fair-dealing exceptions as users' rights, a fundamental component of copyright policy,
not to be interpreted restrictively).
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
60.
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962).

See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
61
REV. 1569, 1579-81 (2008) (discussing the dominant linear view of incentives in copyright
doctrine); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use? The 1999
Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture (Nov. 11, 1999), in 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 513, 524
(1999); Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 343-44 (2002).
See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in
62.
on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, & Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435,
440-41 (2005) ("A system of private ownership providing the incentive for creation cannot give a
reward to the creator without also having an apparent deadweight loss in the consumption
market."); see also Lunney, Jr., supra note 11, at 569.
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 62, at 442. ("Once one accepts copyright as the
63.
mechanism to provide incentives for creative works, and agrees that all books are given the same
copyright term, then the 'productive' deadweight losses are best understood as irrelevant to
welfare considerations, since there is no other manner in which they could become part of the
surplus within the confines of the chosen copyright mechanism."). Note that the Authors
distinguish between "productive" deadweight loss caused by necessary incentives and
unnecessary deadweight losses realized after an author recoups a sufficient price to justify
investment, but reach no conclusion as to whether any additional extension of copyright would
result in more benefit from extra incentives than harm from unproductive deadweight loss. See
Real Copyright Reform, supra note 14, at 29 (critiquing the argument that "[d]iminishing
copyright . . . will decrease authors' incentives to create and distribute new works, leaving
readers, listeners, and viewers with fewer new works to enjoy").
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rational actors who would prefer not to pay for access, limiting free
riding is a necessary part of maintaining an efficient market. 64
For rights-based approaches, free riding is often wrongful
because there is no general right of access to another's creative
expression.6 5 Generally speaking, rights-based arguments rely upon
one of two propositions: (1) the labor-desert proposition, which argues
that creators should be able to control what they create, or (2) the
proposition that creators are personally invested in their creations and
are accordingly entitled to property rights to ensure that their
The common Lockean
personality interests are respected.6 6
labor-desert claim is fundamentally based on avoiding the harm to the
laborer that occurs when others appropriate the laborer's expression.67
Because expression is nonrivalrous, this claim usually rests on the
assumption that copying interferes with the laborer's plans to sell or
control her expression.6 8
Personality arguments justify similarly
69
In these arguments, free riding is harmful
strong authorial control.
because it can interfere with the author's plan for the work. 70
Because neither utilitarian nor rights theories view barriers
imposed on access as undesirable, the major limit on copyright comes
only from the impact of exclusivity on future authors. In utilitarian
theory, this limit comes from the dynamic nature of incentives to
create.7 1 Since creative expression inevitably draws on past works,
64.
See Cohen, supra note 59, at 351 (arguing that from a perspective of copyright that
focuses on an economic view of access, "[t]he economic user's motivations for unauthorized
copying are easy to understand-he is trying to get away with paying less than the market price
for a particular cultural good-but thwarting them is untroubling for the same reason"); see also
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276 (2007)
(arguing that intellectual property law should not seek to internalize the full social benefit of
new works); Lemley, supra note 23, at 1032 (arguing that free riding is a fundamental part of the
utilitarian copyright balance).
See Himma, supra note 56, at 1159 ("The author's interest wins over the interests of
65.
other persons in content that is merely desired.").
66.
See Tehranian, supra note 58, at 9-11.
67.
See Gordon, supra note 41, at 1544-45.
68.
See id. at 1547; McGowan, supra note 23, at 39.
See Hughes, supra note 40, at 337-39; see also Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability
69.
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 347, 374-77 (1992). But see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual
Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453, 500-01 (2005) (arguing that use of Hegel to justify the
necessity of either exclusive property rights or moral rights regimes are based on a fundamental
misreading of Hegelian theory, which holds that "[tihe content of any specific property regime
can only be determined by positive law, and positive law is a creature of pragmatic reasoning,
not speculative logic" (footnote omitted)).
70.
See MERGES, supra note 23, at 77-78; cf. Waldron, supra note 54, at 883-84
(critiquing rights arguments that view copying as necessarily harmful).
See the argument that:
71.
A single-minded focus on incentivizing creation could lead to maximalist intellectual
property claims. The only limit on intellectual property would be found in (1) the claim
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any increase of incentives for authors will impose more costs on future
72
Law-and-economics
authors as access becomes more expensive.
approaches to copyright theory address the difficult balancing process
First, theorists point out that
largely by defining around it.73
copyright rarely gives a monopoly in the classical sense, since most
74
expressive works are fungible and substitutable on the market.
Second, the construction of the idea-expression dichotomy ensures
that the pool of human knowledge is ever expanding; increasing
copyright protection increases incentives and therefore the number of
works produced, and users will thus have a greater pool of ideas to
consume and build upon, even as access to any particular expression
becomes increasingly costly. 75
For rights-based approaches, exclusivity must not interfere
with the autonomy or liberty of other individuals. In Lockean theory,
an appropriation can be justified only on the proviso that it leaves
"enough and as good" an opportunity for future laborers. 76 Similarly,
personality theories emphasize that future authors must have the
ability to express themselves.7 7 Again, these limitations are often
defined by an assumption that the idea-expression dichotomy provides
78
sufficient access for future authors.
In both cases, a view of progress that prizes originality in
expression informs the trust that the idea-expression dichotomy is
that additional intellectual property rights are unnecessary to spur creation, and (2)
situations where expanding intellectual property rights for some will interfere with
others' ability to create.
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Foreword, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls's Ass? Intellectual
Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563, 574 (2006).
See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
72.
154-56 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A

&

CONNECTED WORLD 105 (2001); LITMAN, supra note 32, at 15-16.
See Boyle, supra note 59, at 96-97.
73.
See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic
74
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1734 (2000); William M. Landes
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 518 ("Valuable
works are also those that confer monopoly power.").
See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 2-3; Hughes, supra note 40, at 325; Kitch, supra
75
note 74, at 1730; R. Polk Wagner, Essay, Information Wants to Be Free:Intellectual Property and
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1034 (2003).
See Gordon, supra note 41, at 1562-70.
76
See MERGES, supra note 23, at 91 ("Just as with Locke, Kant requires that an
77.
appropriator take others into account from the outset, from the moment of first appropriation.
And Kant does so for a very similar reason: because he considers the needs and potential claims
of others just as important as those of the owner."); see also Hughes, supra note 40, at 336
(arguing that limits of appropriation based on autonomy of third parties in personality theory
are very similar to the Lockean proviso that appropriation leave as much and as good for others).
See Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/ExpressionDichotomy
78.
in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 18-19 (2003); see also Leslie A Kurtz,
Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1254 (1992).
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The teleology of progress presupposes the continual
effective.
romantic production of works of original genius that advance their
fields, providing enjoyment in themselves and bringing new ideas into
existence. Compared to the genius of original authorship, the "slavish
copying" of expression appears relatively unimportant. 9
B. Access in an Abundant Age
The result of this teleology of progress and the conjunction of
economic and rights theories is a view of access that the market
adequately fulfills. "Access," under the dominant ideal of progress,
means access to a smoothly functioning commodity market with low
transaction costs where almost every flow of information is metered
and priced at a sufficiently low rate to satisfy broad demand.80 A
competitive, efficient marketplace means that both consumers and
future authors can obtain a license for any use at a reasonable fee. 81
Exceptions to the rule can then predominantly be confined to
identifiable instances of market failure. 82 Balancing incentives and
access is accordingly reducible to ensuring that there are sufficient
incentives to maintain diversity of expression and sufficient
competition to ensure relatively low prices.
While this vision of access likely provides the best possible
outcome for publishers, there is no guarantee that it represents the
This vision of
best copyright deal imaginable for the public.8 3
copyright idealizes the market as a "celestial jukebox," in which the
entire store of recorded human creativity will be digitized and
everyone will, for a reasonable fee, be able to access the most obscure,
esoteric works in any format and on any device.84 But the model of

See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON
79.
L. REV. 319, 348 (2007).
80.

See, e.g.,

BART CAMMAERTS

& BINGCHUN

MENG, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 9 (2011) ("Providing user-friendly, hassle-free solutions to enable users
to download music legally at a reasonable price, is a much more effective strategy to enforce
copyright than a heavy-handed legislative and regulatory regime."); Karaganis, supra note 17
(arguing that media piracy should essentially be regarded as a failure in appropriate pricing).
See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.
81
2005) ("Get a license or do not sample. We do not see this as stifling creativity in any significant
way.").
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
82
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982).
See LITMAN, supra note 32, at 35-75 (explaining that copyright bargains reached by
83
industry stakeholders are not generally drafted with the public's interests in mind); see also
Litman, supra note 39, at 39-40 (arguing that the digital marketplace model "is not particularly
enticing").
See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
84
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (2003).
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copyright as a commodity market8 5 is a model of access fundamentally
predicated on artificial scarcity-a model that deliberately limits
access in order to make it more profitable.8 6 It is a model that
encourages publishers to attempt to control and monetize each distinct
act of access and cultural dissemination.8 7 It is a model, perversely, in
which the most socially valuable expression is the most contained and
It is also a model in which "access"
the most expensive.
predominantly means "consumption"; the room it leaves for creative
play8 8 remains tightly controlled by intermediary publishers.

The Internet infrastructure that provides zero-marginal-cost
distribution should cast doubt on this conception of access. The
potential abundance of expression has tremendous benefits for access
to knowledge and culture. With some effort, all connected individuals
could have immediate access to almost perfect reproductions of the
entire wealth of recorded cultural expression on their personal
computers, portable devices, and in schools and public libraries. 89 In
that world, the common wealth of human creativity could circulate
freely in a virtuous cycle of reexpression, in which citizens can freely
But the
learn, play with, and rearticulate cultural expression.
continued prevalence of the incentives-access paradigm pushes these
As long as scarcity is viewed as
visions to the margins.9 0
fundamentally necessary in order to stimulate future production and
progress, increasing access by decreasing exclusivity will continue to
be counterproductive. 91
III. A VISION OF PROGRESS THAT FOREGROUNDS ACCESS
If progress is copyright's core goal, we should critically examine
the assumption that it is best served by an exclusive market of
expression. The dominant view of progress focuses on a teleological
ideal of romantic production. This Article explores how copyright

See Cohen, supra note 15, at 38.
85.
See Georgia Harper, OA, IRs and IP: Open Access, Digital Copyright and
86.
Marketplace Competition, 4 AM. LIBRARY AsSOC. 2009 MIDWINTER MEETING, http://wikis.ala.org/
midwinter2009/images/5/5e/HarperGMVO9handout.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
See Cohen, supra note 15, at 39 ("Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement
87seeks to produce standardized, predictable flows of information.").
88.
See Cohen, supra note 6.
There remains, of course, a significant digital divide problem in the disparity of
89
access to telecommunications services enjoyed by marginalized groups in developed communities
and the bulk of citizens in developing countries. See L.M., Hailing the Google Bus, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 2, 2011, 10:22 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/10/internet-developingcountries.
90.
See Lunney, Jr., supra note 11.
91.
See Harper, supra note 86, at 1.
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might look if it focused on access, the impoverished half of the
incentives-access binary. Much of the tension in modern copyright
discourse stems from the clash between two normative visions: one
where the celestial jukebox can provide adequate (even ideal) access to
cultural expression, and one where users are substantially freer to
access, learn from, and play with abundant expression. 92 The shared
understanding in the mainstream copyright dialectic is that the
public's desire to access c6pyright expression without paying must be
restrained for the common good. 93 Increasingly, however, stronger
even
models-and
for
abundance
justifications
normative
95 By highlighting the positive effects of the
94
-are
emerging.
piracy
nonrivalrous nature of information, this discourse has inverted the
traditional conception of intellectual property as a solution to the
tragedy of the commons. These "commons" theories challenge the
implicit assumption that the commodity market provides adequate
access to cultural expression, focusing on the benefits of abundant flow
of expression that a tightly controlled, metered, and commoditized
model of access cannot deliver. 96 Many authors have considered the
virtues of nonrivalrous sharing; this Article draws on this literature to
emphasize the benefits of abundance, sharing, serendipitous
discovery, and the continuous flow of creative works to knowledge,
entertainment, self-expression, and play.
A. Access
First, access in itself should be encouraged. Access to cultural
expression is the means by which people learn and grow. 97 The spread
of knowledge through society is a fundamental component of
progress.9 8 In particular, society should encourage access to learning
92.
See generally Madison et al., supra note 12, at 659 (developing a model of commons
management of intellectual property).
93.
See id. at 666.
94.
See, e.g., Letter from Shuddhabrata Sengupta, A Letter to the Commons (Jan. 19,
2007), availableat http://archive.icommons.org/articles/a-letter-to-the-commons.
95.
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1157-58.
See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 2, at 5.
96.
97.

See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW

OF USERS' RIGHTS 52 (1991); PATTERSON & BIRCH, JR., supra note 32, at 284 ("The primary goal
of copyright is the promotion of learning."); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair
Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565-66 (2004)
("Copying promotes democracy by literally putting information in citizens' hands.").
98.
Eben Moglen, for example, makes the point that human society must have wasted
the potential of thousands of Einsteins by not providing them with sufficient access to knowledge
and potential to learn. He describes the political goal of the information society as realizing:
the desire to make it possible for everybody to be exposed to that which makes brains
larger, more powerful, more humane, more thoughtful, which decreases recourse to
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The nonrivalrous nature of
materials as widely as possible. 99
information, in this sense, can be extremely beneficial to substantive
equality by increasing access to cultural goods without imposing costs
on creators (setting aside, for the moment, the public goods production
On distributional grounds, the great social cost of
problem).10 0
excluding users who cannot afford to pay the monopoly price of
copyright expression, which is costless to distribute, is deeply
troubling.101
B. Abundance
Second, abundance in expression is fundamentally desirable.
When expression is scarce, users must exercise judgment before
determining whether it is worth consuming or not. 102 Consumers
must balance the benefit they expect to receive against the costs they
Even when the costs are insignificant, this
expect to bear. 103

violence and the sense of desperation, the desire to do what we all know it is best to do
for ourselves and therefore what we ought to know it is best to do for other people as
well.
Eben Moglen, Software Freedom Conservancy, Free and Open Software: Paradigm for a New
Intellectual Commons, Law of the Commons Conference (Mar. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-tbcyZxXLl8. Furthering that point, Professor Litman states:
Already, a network of people sharing what they know has made many of the most
popular reference sources obsolete. Thus, one might reasonably expect that a law
designed to promote the Progress of Science would encourage the robust growth and
prodigious use of this network to exchange the full spectrum of interesting material.
Litman, supranote 39, at 14.
See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Propertyfrom Below: Copyright and Capability for
99.
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 846 (2006).
See id. at 841; Robert Cunningham, The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information
100.
Semicommons: A CulturalEnvironmental Perspective, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 19-20 (2010).
James Boyle, Property Rights: Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price
101.
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2031 (2000) ("[Any
analyst who is even a little uneasy about the 'ability and willingness to pay' metric of valuation
would find it particularly hard to say that the poor should not get access to a social resource with
zero marginal cost simply because they cannot afford to pay for it."); Chon, supra note 99, at 833
(arguing that while "[iun the public goods jargon, static inefficiencies (or higher costs of goods)
are generated as an inevitable residual of IP protection such as copyright," the costs of
prohibiting access to educational materials, from a substantive equality perspective, are very
great). Professor Gordon notes:
Culture is interdependence, and requiring each act of deliberate dependency to render
an accounting would destroy the synergy on which cultural life rests. Even if the
accounting were done painlessly-by a magic computer that somehow could costlessly
determine who contributed what and could prepare a continuously up-to-date,
self-executing list of debits and credits-part of our self-concept as a people depends
upon our having a common heritage. Parceling out that heritage to only those willing
and able to pay destroys part of its value.
Gordon, supra note 5, at 168.
102.
See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 59.
103.
See id.
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cost-benefit analysis plays an important role in slowing down access.
The result is a dampening of serendipitous exposure.1 04 Abundant
access to cultural goods means that consumers are more likely to be
exposed to expression that brings unexpected benefits-benefits they
did not foresee and could not have bargained for. This can also
provide a real benefit to authors, who are potentially able to gain
increased exposure and reach a larger audience than if every reader
had to estimate in advance whether the perceived benefit would be
worth the asking price. 0 5 Abundance in culture promotes flow, which
furthers progress by fostering diversity and destabilization in "settled
modes of knowing." 0 6
C. Sharing
Third, sharing has substantial social value.
Economically,
peer-to-peer file sharing can be much more efficient than centralized
distribution models, particularly because volunteer users are often
prepared to bear the costs of digitizing, organizing, and distributing
expressive material. 107 It follows that copyright law should not aim to
impose access costs in order to support entrenched distribution models
unless no other viable, more efficient mechanisms exist. 08 More
importantly, however, sharing is important in itself. Sharing can be
personally expressive, as when someone puts great care into creating
a mix-tape for a friend,109 collates an obscure collection of her favorite
works for the public to enjoy, or quotes extensively from powerful
material to persuade an audience, to reaffirm a position, or to identify
with a group.11 0 Communal enjoyment of shared expression is also
very important; it provides a shared discourse for communication,"' a
104.
See id. at 61.
105.
Cory Doctorow, Think Like a Dandelion, Locus MAG., (May 6, 2008, 8:10 PM),
(arguing
http://www.locusmag.com/Features/2008/05/cory-doctorow-think-like-dandelion.html
that traditional conceptions of waste are much less important where distribution costs are
negligible and that it is more important to increase the potential audience by facilitating copying
than to ensure payment is received for each and every copy).
106.
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1168; see also Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers,
Chaos Theory, and Cogitation:A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standardin Copyright Law,
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 259, 274 (2004) ("There is increasing scientific evidence that chance is the
primary source for novel thoughts.").
107.
See Litman, supra note 39, at 8-9.
See id. at 30-31 ("If sharing is a more effective method of dissemination than selling
108.
copies, then prohibiting sharing to protect the market for copy sales is exactly backward.").
Tushnet, supra note 97, at 545, 566-67.
109.
110.
Id. at 562, 566-67 (explaining the benefits of non-transformative copying for
self-expression, persuasion, and affirmation).
111.
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 411-12
(2003); Tushnet, supra note 97, at 545-46.
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way for fans to connect with others who enjoy particular works, and a
way for groups to spread information about newly discovered works. 112
Much more than simple unpaid distribution and marketing, sharing is
a social act, a conversation between users about the material that
animates and connects them. 113 Through these conversations, sharing
is itself a vital part of progress that the more sterile and
commercialized distribution systems that centralized marketing
models provide cannot fully replace. 114
D. Creative Play
Fourth, rich access to expression is important because it is a
predicate for creative play, which is valuable for its own sake as well
as for its contribution to progress. Borrowing, learning, and imitating
are fundamental components of the creative process.11 5 "Progress"
occurs when users grow and when they share their own creative play
The familiar emphasis on romantic creativity
with society. 116
preferences "original" expression and undervalues the harm caused by
exclusive restrictions on use of expression.11 7 As countless theorists
have noted, creativity does not occur in a vacuum. 18 The romantic
myth of the author as a solitary genius creating wholly original work
largely emerged from, and was popularized for, political purposes.' 1 9

See Sharingand Stealing, supra note 39, at 7 (explaining the benefits of sharing for
112.
the dissemination of information); see also Jenine Peta Beekhuyzen, A Critical Ethnography of
an Online File Sharing Community: An Actor-Network Theory Perspective of Controversies in
the Digital Music World 31 (Dec. 2009), (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Griffith University) (on
http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adtat
available
University),
Griffith
file
with
(describing the active
root/uploads/approvedladt-QGU20100909.072742/public/O1Whole.pdf
participation of members of an underground filesharing community).
See Litman, supra note 39, at 7.
113.
See id. at 23-24.
114.
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context,
115.
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 482 (2007).
116.

MIHALY CSiKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY

AND INVENTION 6-7 (1997); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1191 ("Within the realm of creative practice,
the play of culture is the to-and-fro in flows of artistic and cultural goods and in cultural
practices of representation. Play in this sense is an essential enabling condition of cultural
progress.").
Silbey, supra note 79, at 350 ("Much copyright doctrine remains preoccupied with
117.
valuing certain works of authorship more strongly than others").
See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the
118.
Scientist, 75 MO. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (2010).
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
119.
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 52 (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 219-20 (1998); KAPLAN,

supra note 24, at 23-25; Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and
Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 296-97 (1992); Jaszi, supra note 45, at
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In practice, creativity is much more collaborative, iterative, and
improvisational. 120
This conception of creativity is not limited to modern
appropriation of art, remix, and sampling; even the highest examples
of classical (romantic) authorship are fundamentally based on
borrowing.1 21 Creative expression has always been a social practice,
firmly embedded within the author's cultural context. 122 It is always,
to some extent, the re-expression of existing cultural works.1 23
Learning and imitating past expression is a vital part of the creative
process that requires not that works be wholly original, but that they
be sufficiently "appropriate" to be understandable within a particular
cultural context.1 24 Increased access and lower barriers to producing
and distributing expression are likely to promote a more
decentralized,
diverse
culture. 12 5
Recognizing
that
the
romantic-author myth undervalues
accessing, borrowing,
and
re-expressing existing expression should cast serious doubt on the
appropriateness of the idea-expression dichotomy in providing
sufficient leeway for future creators, therefore mitigating the harmful
effects of exclusivity in copyright.1 26 Even without the instrumental

&

458-59; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZo ARTS
ENT. L.J. 279, 287-89 (1992).
See BOYLE, supra note 72, at 153-54; LESSIG, supra note 72, at 105; Arewa, supra
120.
note 115, at 494 (arguing that views of creativity in copyright doctrine are often at odds with "the
reality of borrowing and copying in the creation of new works"); Jaszi, supra note 119, at 304;
Tushnet, supra note 97, at 552 ("As Picasso (or someone else) said, 'Good artists borrow; great
artists steal."' (footnote omitted)).
121.

See JACK STILLINGER, MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP AND THE MYTH OF SOLITARY GENIUS

98 (1991); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 601-06 (2006) (describing pervasive borrowing by
masters in the classical music canon); John Carlin, Culture Ventures: Artistic Appropriationand
Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 106 (1988) ("In the early twentieth
century, the incorporation of existing source material directly into works of art became
commonplace. . . . In literature the same basic technique underlies some of the most important
works of Modernism . . . ."); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge
Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 837-38 (2010) (describing borrowing as intrinsic to the
learning, practicing, and creative process of Vincent van Gogh).
122.
Cohen, supra note 6, at 1189.
123.
See id. at 1176-77; Jaszi, supra note 45, at 459-63; Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990).
124.
CSiKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 116, at 28-30 (defining creativity as being dependent
on acceptance within a domain); Fromer, supra note 25, at 1499 ("[A]rtists, scientists, and
engineers typically-although not always-need to spend substantial amounts of time learning
that which came before them to be able to create in their particular domain.").
125.
See Litman, supra note 39, at 26.
126.
See Arewa, supra note 115, at 491 (arguing that the reasoning behind the
idea-expression dichotomy conflicts "with views of creation evident in fields such as musicology
and literary criticism"); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1192-93; Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright
unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 81-82 (2004) (arguing that

VANDERBILT J OFENT. AND TECH. LAW

320

[Vol. 15:2:297

argument, however, when creativity is a private, unrewarded, and
unacknowledged act, it is a fundamental component of the good life. 12 7
Creativity is active enjoyment, where the user grows through personal
exploration and manipulation of cultural expression. 128 This growth is
beneficial and desirable for its own sake.
E. Pervasive Creativity
Finally, while access is a predicate for creativity, the interests
of authors should not be separated from those of users. The romantic
distinction between creative authors and passive consumers is simply
false.129 Creativity, as Professor Eben Moglen says, "flows in the
network" of society. 130 Creativity is not a scarce resource whose
production society needs to incentivize-rather, creativity is
abundant. 131 More importantly, and perhaps most overlooked by the
romantic vision, creativity is ordinary; it is not easily separable from
consumption, but it instead forms part of a "continuous history of
Recognizing that creativity is
everyday cultural practice." 132

suppressing the reuse of copyright expression by users with a personal connection does not
satisfy the Lockean proviso that property is only justified where it leaves "enough" for others).
See William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L.
127.
REV. 1417, 1468-72 (2010); Silbey, supra note 24, at 2118 ("[T]he value of the work is in the
everyday, not in the rare moment of inspiration. Even work that is less successful is a source of
pride and honor because it is the doing, not the value of the end-product, that is worthwhile.").
Professor Tushnet also argues that:
Creativity, including remix creativity, is part of a good life. It should be valued for
itself, not tolerated. . . . [Rjespect for creativity, and for the possibility that every
person has new meaning to contribute, should be at the core of our copyright policy.
Instead of monetary rewards or even artistic control of how works are transmitted to
others as our highest value, we should aim for policies that maximize
participation . ...

Tushnet, supra note 25, at 538-39 (footnote omitted).
128.

CSiKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 116, at 2, 5.

See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1192-93; Silbey, supra note 79, at 348; Tushnet, supra
129.
note 97, at 566-68.
Moglen, supra note 24 ("It's an emergent property of connected human minds that
130.
they create things for one another's pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too
alone.").
131.
Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
951, 989-90 (2004) (explaining the importance of "selection" to the copyright industries in
identifying the most valuable works from an abundant pool of creativity); Madison, supra note
121, at 821; Tushnet, supra note 25, at 522-27 (explaining that "[m]any standard experiences of
creativity simply do not fit into the incentive model" and describing compulsions to create:
"People create as a function of their humanity[,]" or "creativity routinely feels good." (emphasis
added));

see YOCHAI

BENKLER,

THE

WEALTH

OF NETWORKS:

How

SOCIAL PRODUCTION

TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92-99 (2006) (discussing motivations to produce).
See Jean E. Burgess, User-CreatedContent and Everyday Cultural Practice:Lessons
132.
From YouTube, in TELEVISION AS DIGITAL MEDIA 311, 316 (James Bennett & Niki Strange eds.,
2011); see also Jean E. Burgess, Hearing Ordinary Voices: Cultural Studies, Vernacular

2013]

ACCESS, PROGRESS, AND FAIRNESS

321

pervasive, distributed, and abundant highlights a deep bias in
copyright theory: the preference for professional authorship over the
"substandard" content that amateurs and copiers create. 133 Copyright
must provide a means to allocate capital for large-scale professional
productions. 134 Importantly, however, there is no strict dichotomy
between amateur and professional creators; creative practice is much
more fluid. 135 Copyright policy should also avoid assuming that the
publisher-dominated market provides an objective evaluation of the
value of cultural production. 136 Indeed, if creativity is not a scarce
resource, society may be able to reject the meritocratic need to engage
in a priori valuation and instead explore other selection mechanisms
that evolve out of a richer abundance of creative output. 1 3 7 It follows

that if one of copyright's aims should be to encourage creativity itself,
it should do so primarily by ensuring that members of society have
sufficient access to cultural works and the ability to use, learn from,
and reexpress them.1 38
Creativity and Digital Storytelling, 20 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 201 (2006)

(explaining "vernacular creativity").
133.

See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 17, 92 (2007).

134.
See Copyright as Property, supra note 24, at 148.
135.
See Jean Burgess & Joshua Green, The Entrepreneurial Vlogger: Participatory
Culture Beyond the Professional-Amateur Divide, in THE YOUTUBE READER 89, 90 (Pelle
Snickars & Patrick Vonderau eds., 2009) (arguing, in the context of user-generated content on
YouTube, that it is "clear that amateur and professional media content, identities and
motivations are not so easily separated"); see also Fisher III, supra note 127, at 1434-35.
136.
See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,
324-27, 337-40 (1997) (explaining that the incentives provided by copyright will often favor some
forms of content over others and encourage wasteful production and competition between
substitutable products); Chon, supra note 29, at 117-22 (critiquing modernist teleological views
of progress as growth); Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 53, at 557-58; Frischmann, supra note
19,at 670 (arguing that the market "demand signaling function of the price mechanism does not
necessarily work well when purchasers/licensees use a resource as an input to produce public
goods (e.g., information) and merit/nonmarket goods (e.g., education)"); Shelley Wright, A
Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 70 (1994)
(critiquing the marginalization of women in the public art marketplace); cf DAVID W. GALENSON,
CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART 341-42 (2009) (arguing that market

price can be a useful indicator of artistic merit, but that a centralized art market with strong
publisher control of expression can seriously inhibit creative experimentation and progress).
137.
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 87 (2008); Hunter & Lastowka,
supra note 131, at 998 ("Now that distributed selection is possible, ex post selection among works
by decentralized agents seems to be a more socially beneficial alternative.").
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1197 ("Creativity requires breathing room, and thrives
138.
on play in the system of culture."); Moglen, supra note 24 ("The resistance of the network [of
cultural production] is directly proportional to the field strength of the 'intellectual property'
system."). This powerfully suggests that copyright entitlements should be narrow and clearly
incomplete, and that the scope for individual experimentation should be generous. Additionally:
[Riespect for creativity, and for the possibility that every person has new meaning to
contribute, should be at the core of our copyright policy. Instead of monetary rewards
or even artistic control of how works are transmitted to others as our highest value,
we should aim for policies that maximize participation.
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The opposition of the two main theoretical justifications in
copyright theory has led to a focus on incentives and exclusivity that
has systematically understated the importance of access in the
formulation of copyright policy." 9 This result is wholly backwards:
while the function of copyright is to provide incentives, its purpose is
to promote progress, which fundamentally requires that users have
access to expression.1 40 Cultural flow, the continuous consumption
and play of expression, is itself exactly what progress iS.1 4 1 Progress
depends on cultural flow in order to ensure "that settled modes of
knowing not become entrenched and calcified.... Stripped of its
association with modernist teleologies, progress consists, simply, in
that which causes knowledge systems to come under challenge and
The reason society encourages cultural
sometimes to shift."1 42
production is so that people can consume, enjoy, learn, and reexpress
cultural works.
IV. REVISITING THE ASSUMED NECESSITY OF EXCLUSIVITY

This reconstituted vision of progress highlights just how
problematic the incentives-access paradigm is. Fundamentally, the
incentives-access paradigm assumes that creative culture is zero sum:
any benefit granted to users necessarily comes at the expense of
authors and producers and, therefore, also at the expense of new
creative expression.1 43 In a world where creativity is abundant and
ordinary, however, this assumption is highly suspect.1 44 A view of
progress that rests firmly on a virtuous cycle of cultural
flow-continual access and reexpression-rejects this zero-sum view
in favor of a view of culture that is substantially more
interdependent.1 4 5 If incentives are unnecessary for creativity and
Tushnet, supra note 25, at 539; see also Arewa, supra note 115, at 518-19 (discussing the conflict
between copyright's exclusivity and the "freedom to copy" in artistic practice).
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1996 (arguing that copyright's "balance" metaphor tends
139.
to prefer concrete entitlements of authors and publishers over the more abstract interests of the
public).
140.

PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supranote 97.

Professor Litman explains:
141.
The reason we want to encourage authors to create and distributors to disseminate
works of authorship is so that people will read the books, listen to the music, look at
the art, watch the movies, play the games, build and inhabit the architecture. That's
how copyright law promotes the progress of science.
Jessica Litman, The Copyright Reuision Act of 2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249, 259
(2009).
142.
Cohen, supra note 6, at 1168.
143.
See Lunney, Jr., supra note 11 (describing the "incentives-access paradigm").
144.
See id. at 485.
145.
See id. at 569-70.
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exclusivity is directly harmful, this reconstructed view of progress
requires reconsideration of the continued dominance of the
incentives-access paradigm. A new paradigm must acknowledge that
copyright has important functions not based in efficiency.
Instrumentally, copyright must provide a mechanism for allocating
capital and funding the production, marketing, and distribution of
expressive works. 146 Importantly, however, it must do so in a way that
is fair. If reconsidering exclusivity means severing the link between
incentives and just rewards, the new paradigm must provide a new
the
and
desert
function
both
the
to
address
way
public-goods-production problem. Ultimately, any viable critique of
the incentives-access paradigm must articulate a new vision of both
what is economically efficient and what is fair.
A. Fairnessin an Exclusive Marketplace
One of the key tensions in current copyright law is that the
exclusive copyright market is often unable to show that it is fair to
It provides an effective framework to
either authors or users.
facilitate the coordination of cultural production1 47 and a
process-based method of ensuring that authors are remunerated in
proportion to the value of their work. At least in theory, exclusivity
allows authors to obtain a fair market price for their creative
productions. In practice, however, copyright is structurally designed
to encourage assignments from authors to producers and publishers.14 8
By concentrating power and money in the hands of intermediaries,
copyright allows producers to offset the flops against the hits in a
Copyright provides some
highly unpredictable marketplace.1 49
certainty to publishers, but the publisher-controlled marketplace
ensures fairness to authors only on average: it provides extremely
high rewards to an extremely small proportion of creators who are

See Cohen, supra note 24 ("In the contemporary information society, the purpose of
146.
copyright is to enable the provision of capital and organization so that creative work may be
exploited."); Fromer, supra note 25, at 1483 ("It is therefore essential that organizations and
individuals provide creators with support for professional success by paying for, promoting,
marketing, and distributing their works.").
147.
Cohen, supra note 24, at 153-54; Silbey, supra note 24, at 2123.
148.
Litman, supra note 16, at 11-12, 35.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 495 ("Which will be hits and which will be
149.
flops is not known in advance. . . . Copyright protection enables the record company to earn
enough money on the hits to cover both their costs and the production and marketing costs of the
many failures.").
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able to win a lottery for attention.1 5 0 A larger group is able to find
employment somewhere in the creative industries, but the majority of
independent professional creators work multiple jobs to fund their
The current system problematically
personal creative work. 15 1
concentrates rewards among a very small proportion of authors in a
way that is much more closely linked to luck than to individual
originality, skill, and talent.1 52
There have been a number of attempts to address the
public-goods problem in copyright theory without relying on an
exclusive market. 153 Broadly speaking, three main approaches for
evaluating the reward that creators deserve have emerged,
corresponding to a conceptual split between whether creators should
be remunerated in proportion to their work's consumption, their time
invested in creating the work, or the value a user derives from the
work. 1 54

See TOWSE, supra note 26 (arguing that copyright supports an asymmetry in market
150.
power between professional artists and publisher intermediaries and generally fails to
adequately reward all but superstar artists).
151.
Litman, supra note 16, at 10; see also STUART CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WHAT'S YOUR
OTHER JOB? A CENSUS ANALYSIS OF ARTS EMPLOYMENT IN AUSTRALIA 5 (2010) ("[In Australia,]

arts employment is characterised by high levels of part-time work and the existence of many sole
practitioners and business operators (unlike the total workforce in which full-time work by wageearning employees is the norm)."); MARTIN KRETSCHMER ET AL., COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS AND
EARNINGS OF VISUAL CREATORS: A SURVEY OF 5,800 BRITISH DESIGNERS, FINE ARTISTS,
available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/
3 (2011),
PHOTOGRAPHERS
ILLUSTRATORS AND

publications/DACS-Report-Final.pdf (finding that visual artists in the UK "have precarious
careers, with typical earnings well below the UK national median wage" and that "[tihe
distribution of income is highly unequal"); MARTIN KRETSCHMER & PHILIP HARDWICK, AUTHORS'
EARNINGS FROM COPYRIGHT AND NON-COPYRIGHT SOURCES: A SURVEY OF 25,000 BRITISH AND

available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/publications/alcs/
23 (2007),
GERMAN WRITERS
ACLS%20Full%20report.pdf (finding that professional writing is risky in the UK and Germany,
with median wages of approximately 64 percent and 42 percent of the national median
respectively and the top 10 percent of writers earning approximately 60 percent and 41 percent
of the total income, respectively); Bureau of Labor Stat., Musicians, Singers, and Related
Workers,

OCCUPATIONAL

OUTLOOK

HANDBOOK,

2

(2010),

http://www.principiacollege.edul

("Because
sites/default/files/ACAlmusicians,%20singers,%20and%20related%20workers.pdf
many musicians find only part-time or intermittent work and experience unemployment between
engagements, they often supplement their income with other types of jobs. The stress of
constantly looking for work leads many musicians to accept permanent full-time jobs in other
occupations while working part time as musicians.").
Arewa, supra note 26 (arguing that unpredictable lottery awards are difficult to
152.
justify compared to other contemporary creators, and particularly so "in the case of collaborative
traditions such as the blues in which multiple participants over extended periods of time may
have contributed to the corpus that was in the end awarded to lucky lottery winners"); Waldron,
supra note 54, at 855 ("[Florces of supply and demand will certainly benefit some producers (and
perhaps penalize others). But they should not therefore be construed as a matter of desert.").
153.
Netanel, supra note 2, at 27.
Eckersley, supra note 2, at 99; Waldron, supra note 54, at 853-55.
154.
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B. Alternative Models
The first set of models, levy-based alternate-compensation
models, attempt to directly measure the use of creative works as an
approximation of value.1 55 These models propose creating a simulated
market to distribute a pool of money according to consumer
preferences, calculated by various algorithms and reporting
schemes. 15 6 These models explicitly address the valuation function of
the exclusive market by replacing it with a simulated market, and
attempt to bootstrap their legitimacy from the status quo by
replicating the returns authors currently receive, at least initially,
while doing away with scarcity. 15 7
A second set of models relies on the nonrivalrous nature of
expression and reject the assertion that society should reward creators
in direct proportion to the consumption of their work. These models
emphasize the relational nature of creative production, arguing that
without artificial scarcity, authors would be rewarded on the basis of
what is scarce-skill and talent in creative services, complementary
goods, or the audience attention authors are able to capture.' 5 8 In
these models, professional authors can support themselves by creating
commissioned works through advertising and product placement,
cross-subsidization from valuable services like performances or
speaking engagements, and sales of merchandise and other
value-added goods. 15 9 Some of these models also rely on alternative
methods of raising capital for cultural production, where creators can
solicit funds through voluntary tips, "pay-what-you-like" schemes, and
crowd-sourced financing.1 6 0
A third model seeks to fulfill copyright's desert function by
measuring an author's entitlement by reference to the value of her
expression. 161 This model, loosely based on the principles of unjust
enrichment, would impose an obligation on certain types of users,
particularly commercial users, to account for a portion of the benefit
155.
Eckersley, supra note 2, at 106-07.
Id. at 109-10.
156.
157.
See FISHER III, supra note 2, at 208.
Eckersley, supra note 2, at 131.
158.
See generally ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 180-89 (providing an analysis of many
159.
business models that producers can rely on in the absence of scarcity).
See, e.g., Kelsey & Schneier, supra note 4; Kylie J. Veale, Internet Gift Economies:
160
Voluntary Payment Schemes as Tangible Reciprocity, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 1, 2003), http:/fwww.
firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrapbin/ojsindex.php/fm/article/view/1101/1021.
See Gordon, supra note 5, at 172-73; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
161.
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 57 (2002) (arguing that a
profit-sharing liability rule for derivative works is necessary to avoid impinging on the free
speech rights of authors of derivative works).
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they derive through use of creative expression. 162 This model takes
seriously the rights-based arguments for copyright and attempts to
create a structure that allows unremunerated personal use but
requires compensation for commercial uses. 163 By tying desert to
derived value, this model creates a measure of worth and reward that
is not directly reliant on an actual or simulated market. 164
V. FAIR REWARDS IN COPYRIGHT THEORY
A. FairRewards
The first avenue for research that this Article proposes is a
deeper investigation of fairness in copyright theory. Each of the
abundance models discussed in this Article reflects a deep theoretical
divide over how society should reward creative labor. The dominant
view of progress in copyright rests on the ideal of the independent,
romantic genius who toils to produce a creative work embodied (fixed)
in a product: the book, the record, the painting, or the compact disc, to
name a few. 165 In order to ensure that investors have the right
incentives to invest in the best work and that authors are rewarded in
proportion to the worth of their works, this dominant vision of
progress requires an accounting system based on access and use of
distinct pieces of expression. 166 It follows, in this system, that only a
property or liability rule based on consumption will guarantee fair
rewards. 167 This bias explains the development of the levy-based
alternate-compensation models, which are attractive because they
simultaneously seek to provide authors with incentives to create and a
just reward for their efforts.1 6 8 These models develop complicated
schemes to simulate a market that can neutrally approximate the
value of creative works, thus ensuring both that the right work is
being created 69 and the best work is being rewarded. 170 They rely on

Gordon, supra note 5, at 183.
162.
Id. at 190-91.
163.
Id. at 183.
164.
See id. at 150.
165.
See Litman, supra note 14, at 13.
166.
167.
Gordon, supra note 5, at 182.
Netanel, supra note 2, at 85.
168.
FISHER III, supra note 2, at 223 ("Only if [musicians and filmmakers] know what
169
consumers desire-and know that the sizes of their own incomes depend upon the extent to
which their products satisfy those desires-will they be induced, collectively, to produce an
optimal mix of music and movies."); Netanel, supra note 2, at 53 (arguing that a non-commercial
use levy should mirror rewards under the current copyright system and ensure, as far as
possible, that "the copyright holder's remuneration reflects the work's social value and thus gives
copyright holders an incentive to produce more works that people want").
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and fulfill the familiar conception of expression as an owned good, for
which every use should be compensated, even if the good does not
share the exclusivity of personal property.1 7 1
The second set of models rejects the proposition that society
should reward authors in direct proportion to the consumption of their
works. 1 7 2 Because expression is nonrivalrous, these models view
creative labor as a service and attempt to find a method to reliably
compensate authors for their time.1 73 In a way, while these models
differ from the romantic ideal of creative production, they provide a
closer reflection of reality for many creative laborers.17 4 For many in
the creative industries, copyright is assigned to an employer or
commissioner upon its creation-creativity is a service provided for a
fee. 75 Though creative workers are substantially more likely to
sustain themselves through employment and contract work than by
becoming famous enough to sell copies of works, fairness in
mainstream copyright theory remains somewhat star struck. 176 The
idealization of mass-media stars entrenches a view of the author as
genius, distinct from ordinary laborers, and deserving of reward in
Success, in this popular
direct proportion to her popularity.17 7
returns, not a
monopolistic
fame
and
meritocratic ideal, really means
17
more modest but more certain fair wage.
B. A Better Model of Fairness
This deep theoretical conflict about the rewards authors are
morally entitled to opens the possibility of a better model of fairness in
Although fairness plays a significant role in
copyright theory.

That work is rewarded because:
170
At least in the view of most Americans and Western Europeans, distributive justice
requires giving each person in a collective enterprise (whether it be a project, an
industry, or a society) a share of its fruits proportional to his or her contribution to the
venture. Applied in this context, that belief justifies adjusting artists' rewards to
match their relative contributions to consumers' enjoyment of entertainment
products.
FISHER III, supra note 2, at 223-24.
Id. at 224.
171.
172.
Id.
173.
KWALL, supra note 13, at 12.
FISHER III, supra note 2, at 233.
174.
Litman, supra note 14, at 10-11 ("The copyright statute incorporates a decided bias
175.
in favor of distributors. . . . [T]he copyright system encourages the author to assign her copyright
to a distributor in exchange for exploitation.").
See KWALL, supranote 13, at 9.
176.
177.

JIB FOWLES, STARSTRUCK: CELEBRITY PERFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 261

(1992) ("[N]o others are valued as much as stars.").
178.
Id. at 9.
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copyright discourse, it is significantly underdeveloped. 179 Utilitarian
economic approaches tend to disclaim distributional and noneconomic
issues in copyright doctrine, while rights theories tend toward a
conception of fairness that prioritizes authorial control without
adequately considering the social interest in greater access to cultural
goods. 18 0 A better model might be to consider cultural policy in terms
of positive capabilities for human flourishing. 181 Before any of the
nonconsumption-based models can provide a convincing account, they
must first show that fairness does not require authors to be paid for
each use of their work. Shifting our conception of progress opens up
new ways of looking at rewards for creative labor in this regard. If
creativity is ordinary and abundant, fairness to creators might not be
so prescriptive. Fairness requires, in a negative sense, that creators
are not exploited-that others do not unjustly benefit from the fruits
of their labor. In a positive sense, it means both that authors must be
sufficiently free in their creative processes and that professional
creators are able to earn a dignified living from their work. 182
Viewing creativity as abundant lends weight to a view of fair
returns based on the time and skill of the professional creative
laborer. This view holds true particularly if society dismantles the
hard distinctions between creative amateurs and professionals,
employees and solitary geniuses, and creative work and other forms of
labor. 183 The fact that creativity is ordinary and abundant, however,
should cause doubt that any one model will provide just outcomes in
all circumstances. 1 84 The ideal of creative labor in copyright theory
requires an analysis of the rewards that the paradigmatic romantic
author should be entitled to. In practice, creators are rewarded in a
wide variety of ways, both economic and noneconomic.18 Fairness, in
this conception, is pragmatic; it turns more on the ability of creators to

179.
180.

Drassinower, supra note 20, at 1869-70.
Id. at 1869.

181.

MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

GLOBAL JUSTICE 20 (2012); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1159-60; see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS
FREEDOM 227, 242 (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities:
"Perception"Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (2007); see also Chon, supra note
99, at 818-19; Fisher III, supranote 127, at 1463-72.
182.
SUNDER, supra note 181, at 95-100 (arguing that fairness includes the capability to
participate in cultural production, recognition of authorship and vulnerability to exploitation,
ability to sustain livelihood, and support of non-market-based cultural production).
Lunney, Jr., supra note 11, at 610 (arguing that copyright can distort labor markets
183.
by providing much higher rewards for the production of intangibles than other socially
productive work).
184.
Id. at 649-51.
185.
Gordon, supranote 5, at 156-57.
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thrive than it does on the particular set of entitlements we choose to
support creativity.1 8 6
This critical examination of fairness has so far been largely
missing from various proposals for nonscarce solutions to the
The alternate-compensation
public-goods problem in copyright.
models are explicitly rooted in a conception of fairness that mirrors
the existing market, without fully considering the distributive
The service-based and
problems that market has created.' 8 7
voluntary-payment proposals tend to focus on efficiency grounds, but
they generally fail to provide a strong normative account to justify
business models that reward authors based on their labor and not
88
Wendy Gordon's
Professor
acts of access.s
individual
unjust-enrichment model provides the most critical examination of
what fairness to authors might require, and she focuses on an
obligation for commercial users to pay authors for the commercial
benefit they derive from expression. 89 Gordon's model addresses the
negative sense of fairness-that authors are not exploited-but does
not attempt to provide a fully fledged examination of whether a
commercial restitutionary obligation could adequately solve the
production problem. 90
The first avenue for future research this Article presents is the
development of a better model of fairness in the rewards that authors
deserve for their work. Proponents of abundance models must further
explore what fairness consists of and how it can be ensured in both
negative and positive senses. In all likelihood, no one solution will be
able to provide a fully satisfactory answer; in practical terms, a
combination of different methods of remunerating authors will likely
be needed for different circumstances. Importantly, however, any
potential alternatives to exclusivity must recognize that exclusivity
plays an important role both in structuring cultural production and in
providing a normatively accepted means of rewarding authorship.
VI. THE RATIONAL CONSUMER AND COMMONS MODELS

Pragmatically, if fairness does rely on the ability of any given
model to financially support professional authors, the service-based
and voluntary-payment models face a particularly acute difficulty:
without the explicit link to consumption, these models embody a

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 157-58.
Eckersley, supra note 2, at 106.
Lunney, supra note 11, at 486.
See Gordon, supra note 5, at 183.
Id. at 184.
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higher, and almost fatal, perceived risk of free riding.191
The
meritocratic assumption that underpins the copyright market ensures,
tautologically, that successful authors can exploit their works. 192
When payments are delinked from consumption, it is conceivable that
a widely consumed ("successful") creative work may not provide
adequate remuneration for the author.19 3 Property rules, liability
rules, and benefit-sharing schemes would ensure that authors are
paid in some ratio to the consumption of their works, but classical
economics suggests that any model that relies largely on voluntary
payments will likely face prohibitive free-riding problems.
A. What Is "Success"?
As a first step, proponents of these models may need to change
their conception of success. Under more abundant views of creativity,
success might mean that an author has been able to express herself;
has been heard by an audience the author desires to engage with; has
been treated fairly; and, if necessary and desired, has been able to
raise the funds to cover production costs and secure a fair return on
Unless such a vision of abundant success can
the investment.
substantially displace the dominance of the meritocratic mass-media
superstar, many service-based models will be incapable of
demonstrating that they are able to reward authorship in a
sufficiently fair manner.
If both creativity and success can be viewed as abundant, then
the next challenge is to demonstrate that any voluntary payment
model can work at all. These models must overcome a large hurdle in
providing a convincing argument that consumers will pay for the
production of nonexcludable goods. The consumer in copyright theory
is predominantly viewed as a classical rational actor; while the
consumer will pay for valuable services and value-added exclusive
products, the consumer will almost certainly not support
crowdfunding or tipping models of production. 194 It seems to make no
sense, through the lens of classical economics, to think that a
consumer would voluntarily pay for the creation of a work that the

191.
Id. at 169-70.
192.
Id.
193.
Id. at 171.
194.
Some modified crowdfunding models attempt to minimize free riding and make it
more rational to invest in cultural production. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 4 (suggesting that
other models attempt to provide rationality by providing incentives like value-added
merchandise and services whose value scales with the pledged amount, for example offering
limited-edition box sets, priority access to new releases, signed first editions, production credits,
offers to perform live, and so on).

2013]1

ACCESS, PROGRESS, AND FAIRNESS

331

consumer knows will be freely accessible if the consumer waits for
others to pay first.
This assumption that copyright must coerce rational users in
order to fund cultural production, like the assumption that the law
must incentivize creators, is highly suspect. Professor Yochai Benkler
points out that, at least where capital costs are relatively low, the
increased ability of individuals to communicate and organize can allow
"various provisioning problems to be structured in forms amenable to
decentralized production based on social relations, rather than
through markets or hierarchies."1 9 5 There is growing evidence that
some creators are able to use crowdfunding and other mechanisms to
leverage the increased potential audience that zero-cost online
distribution provides into a large array of revenue streams not
anchored in artificial scarcity. 196 At this stage, the question is not
whether these models work, but whether they can scale upward, both
in terms of quantity and size. At least for projects that do not require
high levels of capital investment, it seems plausible that these types of
decentralized models can scale upward to fund a substantial
proportion of professional creators, providing revenues at least
comparable to the low rewards typically available under the current
system. Because these models end up cutting out substantial revenue

195.

BENKLER, supra note 131, at 121.

196.

1 BUILDING AN AUSTRALASIAN COMMONS: CREATIVE COMMONS CASE STUDIES 32-34

(Rachel Coberoft ed., 2008) (discussing Nine Inch Nails, who raised $1.6 million for their new
album overnight); Alexis Koster, The Emerging Music Business Model: Back to the Future? 4 J.
BUS. CASE STUD. 17, 19 (2008) (discussing Radiohead, who raised about $3 million from their
album "In Rainbows"); Naomi Alderman, ZOMBIES, RUN! Running Game and Audio Adventure
for iOS/Android, KICKSTARTER (Sept. 8, 2011) (discussing Six to Start, an independent games
producer who raised over $72,000 for a new mobile video game); Rik Falch, D-Day Dice Board
Game, KICKSTARTER (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1325766284/d-day-diceboard-game (discussing Rik Falch, who raised over $175,000 for the publication and commercial
release of a new board game); Ariel Hyatt, In Defense of 1,000 True Fans-Ellis Paul-300
Fans = $100,000 in Contributions The Ultimate Testament to Fan Loyalty, Music THINK TANK
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/in-defense-of-1000-true-fans-part-vii-ellispaul-300-fans-10.html (discussing Ellis Paul, who raised $100,000 for a new album); Greg Kot,
Reinventing the Music Business: Fan DonationsPay for New Jill Sobule Album, CHI. TRIB. (Mar.
it-up/2009/03/reinventing-the-music18, 2009), http://leisureblogs.chicagotribune.com/turn
business-fan-donations-pay-for-new-jill-sobule-album.html (stating that some of the most highprofile crowdfunding success stories include Jill Sobule, who raised $75,000 for a new album in
two months); Yancey Strickler, Amanda's Million, KICKSTARTER BLOG (June 4, 2012),
http://www.kickstarter.com/blog/amandas-million (discussing Amanda Palmer, who raised nearly
$1.2 million for a new album). Note that at this stage, only a small proportion of artists
experimenting with crowdfunding are also releasing the entire final production for free; it seems
that most authors continue to seek to be able to sell copies of the work to the public after it has
been produced.
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previously allocated to intermediaries, consumers or creators (or both)
could in fact be better off than under the current system.19 7
B. Commons Models

.

Both crowdfunding and peer-production regimes provide a
commons-based solution to the public-goods problem. There is a
longstanding assumption that the lack of excludability in a commons
leads to underinvestment from the private sector, which is primarily
addressed by creating property rights or through direct public
regulation. 198 Professor Elinor Ostrom, through a detailed analysis of
a large set of case studies involving natural-resource commons, has
demonstrated that in some circumstances, private actors can develop
complex sets of social norms to effectively manage. common-pool
resources through collective action. 199 Crowdfunding schemes, which
provide methods for private actors to share the costs of creative
cultural production, are an example of a collective-action solution to
the problem of coordinating investment in the production of cultural
works.
Crowdfunding, as a relatively new phenomenon, at least in its
modern form, has not been extensively studied. There is no real
empirical validation of whether the success stories seen so far are
outliers or whether these methods can scale to a sufficiently broad
proportion of cultural production. There is no real evidence as to
whether these models can work adequately to support emerging
artists, as opposed to authors with strong established networks. 200
There is very little evidence about whether nonscarce models work for
massive cultural production, as opposed to small and midsized
projects. 201 None of these models have yet provided a fully convincing

197.
Litman, supra note 14, at 20 ("Some erosion in the position of distributors under
copyright is probably both natural and desirable."); see also Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 131,
at 957 (arguing that other distributed mechanisms might emerge to fill the functions
traditionally carried out by publishers).
198.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Scl. 1243 (1968).
199.
OSTROM, supra note 12, at 24-25.
200.
See, e.g., Guy Morrow, Radiohead'sManagerial Creativity, 15 CONVERGENCE: INT'L
J. RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECH. 161, 174 (2009) (concluding, of Radiohead's In Rainbows
pay-what-you-like "publicity stunt," that, "[w]hile Radiohead have only been able to achieve this
on a massive scale because they are a product of the old system that revolved around mass
marketing, the success of their approach suggests that the industry is in transition"). It should
be noted, however, that emerging artists struggle under the exclusive market until they build
sufficient popularity to sell copies of their works; it is not clear whether crowdsourcing is
substantially more difficult in this regard. Id. at 167.
201.
See Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of
Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 96-97 (2011) (arguing that returns from voluntary
models like KickStarter may not provide sufficient returns to support artists).
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solution to the coordination problem of large-scale cultural production.
More research is required to identify how to coordinate and fund
large-scale projects in the absence of the exclusivity that copyright
provides.
The Institutional Analysis and Development (LAD) framework
that Ostrom developed to analyze natural-resource commonS 202 is a
very promising approach to examining these questions. Professors
Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg have developed a preliminary
modified IAD framework adapted specifically for "constructed cultural
commons," which are "environments for developing and distributing
cultural and scientific knowledge through institutions that support
pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way." 2 0 3 Because
cultural commons are actually engaged in producing the common
resource, the cultural commons TAD framework must be more complex
in the way it considers the resource in the context of attributes and
rules of the community. 204 The IAD framework, as adapted for
constructed cultural commons, provides a useful analytical model to
examine crowdfunding case studies. The framework provides a model
to interpret producers' motivations to create and individuals' decisions
to fund projects, as well as the outcomes and patterns of interactions
between participants. The framework requires explicit examination of
the characteristics of the cultural work, the attributes of the
community involved, and the rules in use at multiple levels. 205 This
approach opens up a number of useful inquiries about the way in
which crowdfunding projects and other commons models operate, the
factors that influence their success, and the types of projects that they
can support.
The promise of commons models is that they offer an approach
to funding cultural production that does not rely on the trade-offs
against access (in the exclusive-rights model) or autonomy (in the
public-funding models). Particularly, commons models should assist
in developing a better understanding of the user in terms of both
access and the ultimate funder of creative production. Much of
current copyright discourse attempts to fit creative practice and
cultural consumption into the model of classical economics. The
fundamental assumption that underpins the current copyright reform
dialectic is that a workable compromise between evolving business
models and harsher penalties is needed in order to create a
normatively acceptable commodity market in expression. Focusing on
202.
203.
204.
205.

See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 8-9 (2005).
Madison et al., supra note 12, at 659.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 689.
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making cultural output fit the commodity model, however, obscures a
more fruitful inquiry: whether there are other viable models, not
based on the opposition of incentives and access, but instead based on
a symbiotic view of cultural production as an ongoing process and
dialog between authors and consumers.
The health of the copyright ecosystem certainly depends on
users internalizing its goals. As Professor Litman argues, it "requires
that members of the public believe that their investment in copyright
is well spent." 2 06

The mainstream copyright-reform process seeks to

drive this normative acceptance by creating a more efficient "celestial
jukebox" 207-a hybrid of simple markets and volume licensing priced
appropriately with reference to demand and degrees of access.
Certainly, paradigmatic models like the iTunes Music Store, Steam,
NetFlix, and Spotify are already driving this sort of normative support
for exclusivity with business models that provide users with a better
deal than traditional models. In the long term, however, achieving
normative support likely requires more than better business models,
simpler rules, and bigger sticks. It requires significantly improving
the limited level of access that exclusive distribution models
represent, and visibly reducing the highly inequitable distribution of
wealth in the creative industries. It may be that the largest threat to
a sustainable copyright model is not the ease of massive infringement,
but the failure of the copyright industry to convince its audience that
the copyright model represents a fair deal both for artists and for
consumers. 208
A better model of the user should highlight not only the
benefits of abundance for learning, expression, and creative play, but
should more deeply examine the motivations that users have to
support the production of creative work. Certainly, users are rational
consumers in many of their interactions with creative expression. But
at other times, users are deeply passionate about creative work, and,
given an opportunity to connect with the creative process and a reason
to do so, they will willingly invest in creative production. 209 Users-or,
more accurately, fans-fundamentally want to support artists. Fans
develop incredibly strong links to their favorite artists that cannot be
explained by the simplistic model of the rational consumer. It is
possible that a more sustainable ecosystem could directly involve fans
206.

Litman, supra note 14, at 18.

207.

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 199-200 (1994).

208.
See Litman, supra note 14, at 31 ("The deterioration in public support for copyright
is the gravest of the dangers facing the copyright law in a digital era.").
See Mike Masnick, The Future of Music Business Models (And Those Who Are
209.
Already There), TECHDIRT (Jan. 25, 2010, 10:18 AM), http://www.techdirt.comlarticles/20091119/
1634117011.shtml.
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in the funding model and, in return, could provide all users with the
The mainstream
benefits that expressive abundance promises.
legitimacy and
to
maintain
dialectic
is
struggling
reform
copyright
normative support from users for a system rooted in artificial scarcity
that seems increasingly at odds with the abundance the Internet has
been able to deliver. Perhaps it is possible, even if it seems irrational,
to instead create a system that provides more abundance and
distributively fairer rewards in order to support an alternative social
norm that users should voluntarily choose to support the artists whose
work they enjoy. Either way, social norms may need to shift, but
there is no guarantee that exclusivity backed by threats of
punishment will be more acceptable than abundance backed by a
direct relationship between creators and fans.
Not all users feel so strongly about the creators of expression
they use and reuse that they will help fund its production. The
question is whether there are enough fans who do care to fairly
subsidize the costs of production. More accurately, the question is
likely whether enough creators are able to cultivate the personal
relationships with their fans necessary to convince those fans to
support the creators' next project. Any model based on voluntary
payments will require creators to be much more involved with their
audiences (whether directly or through an agent); the creators who are
successful without artificial scarcity will likely be the creators who are
able to connect to their audiences and deliver a service that is
sufficiently popular to justify its expense. These models much more
directly put control over creative production in the hands of artists
and fans, rather than requiring producers to make educated guesses
about what types of content will sell. Ideally, an enhanced dialogue
between artists and fans could lead to more variety in the projects
that receive funding and more value created in the goods and services
that creators offer to their fans. This disintermediation could provide
efficiency gains by limiting the huge investments in marketing and
large rents required to support the massively inefficient hits and
misses of the mass-media model. 210 At the very least, society should
critically examine these voluntary payment- and service-based models.
It is no longer clear that users will rationally refuse to support the
production of works they enjoy. It is possible that new models may

210.
See Bambauer, supra note 26, at 377 (describing the role of intermediaries in
spreading risk in copyright markets); Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 131, at 991 ("[Tjhe
majority of films, books, and songs are commercial flops."); Patryk Galuszka, Netlabels and
Democratization of the Recording Industry, FIRST MONDAY (July 2, 2012), http://firstmonday.
org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojsindex.php/fm/article/viewArticle/3770/3278.
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arise that create a sustainable cultural environment based on real
symbiotic relationships between creators and users.
C. A Better CompensationModel
Systems based on voluntary payments and crowdfunding,
however, are unlikely to be able to provide a complete and fair
A better model of
solution to copyright's production problem.
creativity and consumption in copyright may reveal some distinctions
between categories of both users and works that are not amenable to
disintermediated-funding models. As a first pass, it will probably be
necessary to account at least for commercial users for whom
consumption and reuse will likely be predominantly rational. Firms
that depend on creative expression not for its intrinsic value, but for
its commercial benefits, might be significantly more likely to free ride
off of existing expression, and there is a strong argument that
unrestrained commercial free riding could amount to harmful
exploitation. 211 In such circumstances, some level of exclusivity or
liability-rule obligation might remain necessary to deal with
commercial users. 212 There may also be forms of expression that are
basically fungible,' like stock photography, whose creators are
generally unable to develop sustainable relationships with audiences
in order to fund a sufficient amount of cultural production. For these
levy-based
or
production
advertiser-funded
either
forms,
alternatives
best
the
represent
might
models
alternate-compensation
to an exclusive marketplace. Another set of creative practices could be
too marginal to find stable support but too valuable to submit to the
vagaries of the market, and for these, society could choose to use
public grant programs to fund their production. 213 Many such cultural
forms, like symphony or opera, are extremely expensive and currently
depend to a large degree on public or philanthropic support.
The critical point is that there is no reason to adopt a
one-size-fits-all model that assumes that large-scale commercial
See, e.g., SUNDER, supra note 181, at 97-98 (arguing that a "fair" culture must
211.
support livelihood and "recogniz[e] vulnerability to exploitation").
Gordon, supra note 41, at 1566; see also Litman, supra note 14, at 43-44 (suggesting
212.
limiting copyright to an exclusive commercial right, and arguing that "the difference between
commercial exploitation and noncommercial enjoyment captures a distinction that is
fundamental to our understanding of how the copyright system works").
213.
Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
358-59 (1996) (arguing that while public support and private patronage can have detrimental
effects on freedom of speech, "the democratic character of public discourse may well depend upon
some measure of state subsidy and regulation to disseminate information and give a voice to
persons and views that might otherwise receive insufficient attention in an unregulated media
market").
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producers share the same motivations as artistically motivated
authors, or that fans will voluntarily pay for access no more than will
rational investors. The second avenue for future research that this
Article presents is the need for better empirical examination of the
extent to which nonscarce models are workable and scalable. This
research should try to develop a substantially better understanding of
the types of situations and projects that are amenable to crowdfunding
and other nonscarce business models; the characteristics and
experiences of authors with successful and unsuccessful experiments;
and the complex web of factors that influence users to support or not
support various projects.
VII. NONCOMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF FAIRNESS
A. TraditionalConceptions of Authorial Harm
Because mainstream copyright theory has largely obscured
fairness, more exploration into the other aspects of fairness that
exclusivity currently supports is necessary. 2 14 Again, most attempts to
address the public-goods-production problem from an economic
perspective fail to take into account the ways in which exclusivity
These approaches
protects nonpecuniary interests of authors.
they
will lead to
criticisms
that
therefore are vulnerable to
exploitation of authors, even if they adequately address the
incentives-reward problem. Any attempt to limit the exclusivity of
copyright must seriously consider whether and how to fill the gap that
would be left in terms of authorial control over expression. 215
There are hard questions about authorial control and, in
particular, integrity, that do not have answers rooted in efficiency.
Commercial exploitation is an important example; an efficiency-based
approach to creative production would suggest that once an author
has been paid for her creative services, no further permission or
payment is necessary when her work is reused. But this does not fully
answer the question of fairness or harm. It is plausible that unwanted
commodification of creative expression could harm the author's
personality interest in controlling the integrity of the author's work, 2 16

214.
See Gordon, supra note 126, at 88.
215.
KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 120 ("[Tlhe humane development of the 'moral rights' of
authors to prevent abuses in the exploitation of their creations . . . will indeed be especially
important if copyright itself recedes as a significant control."); Inspirationand Innovation, supra
note 25, at 1973 ("A legal system committed to authorial morality must be committed to
recognizing authors' dignity interests.").
216.
See, for example, the French case St6 Gaumont and Luc Besson v Std Publicis
Conseil and Std Frangaisedu Radiotiliphone, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris,
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or that an author could feel that a commercial user who exploits a
work to financial advantage owes the author some duty to account. 2 17
The interests that Continental moral rights protect pose
similar dilemmas. It seems simple to suggest that authors have a
serious enough interest in integrity in their works that society should
grant them a presumptive power to prevent premature or unwanted
publication. 218 Other questions are more difficult. For example, the
extent to which authors should have a right to prevent derogatory
treatments of their works is an important and unresolved tension.
This tension is most evident in the conflict between Anglo-American
copyright law and Continental copyright law, which explicitly provides
moral rights protection. 219
Mainstream copyright theory struggles with a dual view of
authorial control. Copyright's explicit utilitarian overtures suggest
that copyright is not at all concerned with authors' rights, and that
moral rights have no major place in US copyright doctrine. 220 At the
same time, however, exclusivity provides authors with an extremely
powerful ability to control the use of their expression. 221 In this way,
not only does copyright's exclusivity support a liberal solution to the
question of value, it supports a liberal solution to the subjectivity of
Copyright law provides authors with a
potential harm.
property-based contractual method to structure their own relations in
a way that maximizes their autonomy and avoids forcing the state to
4 ch., Sep. 8 2004, D. 2004, No. 35, 2574, obs. J. Daleau (Fr.), where the court held that
Vodafone's use of the character "Leeloo" from Luc Besson's film The Fifth Element in an
advertising campaign was a distortion prejudicial to Besson's moral right of integrity. See
Elizabeth Adeney, Of Personalities and Personae: A French Victory for Film Producers and
Authors, 16 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 109, 118 (2005) ('The character had been denatured in its
spirit by its use in the commercial environment of Vodafone Live advertising.").
See Rubenfeld, supra note 161, at 56-57.
217.
Fair use law already recognizes that releasing unpublished material without the
218.
consent of the author can raise serious concerns, although it is not determinative. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2006); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987); Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, Commentary, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1990). In mainstream
copyright theory, this intuition is supported both by Lockean claims on the basis of a right to
refuse to labor and personality claims on the basis of an autonomy interest in controlling the
release of a personal work. See McGowan, supra note 23, at 22.
See Kwall, supra note 25, at 1972-73.
219.
220.
See id. at 1983.
See Piotraut, supra note 33, at 597-98 (arguing that US copyright law adequately
221.
protects moral rights through the exclusive rights and other common law doctrines); William
Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 537 (1955) ("Without using the
label 'moral right,' or designations of the components of the moral right, the courts in the United
States arrive at much the same results as do European courts. Substantially the same personal
rights are upheld, although often under different principles."); cf. Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright
and the Moral Right: Is an American MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985) (arguing
that while authors' moral rights are protected under a variety of doctrines in the United States,
protection is not as comprehensive or coherent as under an explicit moral rights regime).
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determine difficult questions of what types of actions should be
considered harmful. 222
B. Broader Conceptions of Authorial Harm
More research to investigate the harms that can result from a
lack of strong exclusive rights could help inform the development of
abundance models. The conjunction of economic and rights theories in
that
supports a general presumption
requiring exclusivity
This
excused.
specifically
unless
unauthorized access is harmful,
proposition is, as Professor Wendy Gordon points out, "drastically
overbroad"; 223 a view of culture as interdependent requires recognizing
that "the potential free riders-the users, copyists, and adapters-are
not mere parasites." 224 A better conception of harm would instead
consider the legitimate interests of authors within a social context.2 25
In a world where creativity is abundant, expression is nonrivalrous,
and authors create more out of desire and compulsion than a rational
decision to engage in difficult labor, it might not make sense to view
harm in the acts of sharing, consumption, learning, and creative play,
at least in relation to works made publicly available.
A more particularized view of harm might instead focus on the
acts of users of creative expression-whether the user releases it
before the creator is ready, fails to give proper attribution, subjects it
to derogatory treatment, or unfairly commercially exploits it. Little
consensus exists in the United States as to what degree of control
authors should be entitled to, but without this consensus, critiques of
exclusivity that focus only on the economic public-goods problem will
likely continue to struggle to find normative support.
Fairness requires that creators are still able to flourish and
thrive, and this probably entails some. sort of control over expression,
but it is by no means clear that a monolithic property right is
necessarily the best method to protect authorial interests.
Interestingly, these debates have been playing out in miniature over
the last two decades in the free-software and free-culture
communities, where participants have been shaping contractual
solutions to lessen exclusivity but protect certain personal and
economic authorial interests. Many different licenses attempt to
strike subtly different bargains, and the normative superiority of each
is often hotly contested. The most permissive licenses allow unlimited

222.
223.
224.
225.

See Bambauer, supra note 26, at 403.
Gordon, supra note 5, at 167.
Id. at 157.
Himma, supra note 56, at 1159.
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distribution and modification and mainly impose a requirement of
attribution. 226 Some licenses include clauses designed to protect
authorial integrity by forbidding all modifications. 22 7 A particularly
popular clause in the Creative Commons licenses prohibits all
commercial use, requiring commercial users to seek explicit
permission, and potentially pay appropriate license fees. 22 8 Free
software advocates-who place significant value on the ability to
modify and use without discrimination-view both of these
Many users of both
restrictions with particular hostility. 229
free-software licenses and free-culture licenses seek to protect
themselves from unfair exploitation in another way: by requiring any
modifications to their original work to be released back to the public
under similar terms. 230 These "copyleft" licenses effectively restrict
commercial and noncommercial users from free riding and
appropriating the benefits of the work of others, while still allowing
nondiscriminatory use by those willing to contribute to the communal
efforts.
The proliferation of different types of open licenses highlights
the diversity of ways in which authors view potential harm to their
works. Each of these different licenses reflects a particular conception
of harm, and it is only by building on copyright's exclusive rights that
the licenses are able to strike a balance between access and integrity
with which the author is comfortable. 2 31 The fierceness of the debate

226.
See, e.g., Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0), CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012); The BSD 2-Clause License,
OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php (last visited Feb. 9,
2012); The MIT License (MIT), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org1icenses/mitlicense.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
227.
See, e.g., Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported (CC BY-ND 3.0), CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
228.
See License Statistics, CREATIVE COMMONS WIKI, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/
Metrics/License statistics (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (estimating that the Creative Commons
Non-Commercial clause is used on up to two-thirds of creative works).
See Admin, Stop the Inclusion of Proprietary Licenses in Creative Commons 4.0,
229.
FREECULTURE.ORG (Aug. 27, 2012) http://freeculture.org/blog/2012/08/27/stop-the-inclusion-ofproprietary-licenses-in-creative-commons-4-0; see also Debian Social Contract, DEBIAN (Oct. 2,
2012, 11:25 PM), http://www.debian.org/social-contract (explaining the ten principles of free
software that the Debian GNU/Linux operating system distribution adheres to); What Is Free
Software?, GNU OPERATING SYS. (July 1, 2012, 10:12 AM), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/freesw.html (outlining the four freedoms espoused by the Free Software Foundation).
230.
The most common copyleft licenses are the GNU General Public License, Version 2,
GNU OPERATING SYS. (Oct. 23, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html, and the
attribution share-alike license of the creative commons, Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States
(CC BY-SA 3.0), CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/us (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012).
231.
See Brian F. Fitzgerald & Nicolas Suzor, Legal Issues for the Use of Free and Open
Source Software in Government, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 412, 414 (2005).
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in free-software and free-culture communities about the acceptability
of different restrictions indicates that it may be particularly difficult
to identify a core set of authorial interests that ought to be universally
protected or protectable in the absence of exclusivity in copyright
generally. The liberal approach that copyright currently takes, by
making exclusivity the default and allowing ad hoc contractual
variations, certainly has its advantages.
The final avenue for research that this Article raises is the
need for a better understanding of authorial control and harm. In
particular, copyright theory needs to address the normative question
authors' apprehensions of harm are entirely
of whether
heterogeneous, or whether the law can develop common
understandings of potential harm in such a way that harm can be
minimized without fully exclusive rights. It may be possible to
achieve a desirable result by following a Continental moral rights
approach and establishing personal rights that protect against specific
forms of harm.
Such rights could grant various entitlements,
potentially including requirements of attribution, protection of
integrity, and benefit sharing or veto rights for commercial uses.
Whether any such set of entitlements could be comprehensive,
acceptable, and still provide for a substantial degree of free access,
however, remains an unanswered question. More research is needed
to examine what forms of noneconomic harm authors should have a
right to object to. So far, Anglo-American copyright theory has not
needed to confront this question directly. Without some consensus
about the personal interests copyright should protect, however, the
highly subjective nature of potential harm is likely to pose fatal
problems for abundance models.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The opposition of utilitarian and rights theories in copyright
firmly entrenches the incentives-access paradigm. Together, these
approaches dominate mainstream theoretical copyright discourse,
reinforcing the continued necessity of exclusivity. Too much of the
copyright-reform debate is bound up in a search for ideological purity
or an empirical quest to find the appropriate balance between
incentives and access. 232 Thinking of copyright as a necessary balance
between the rights of authors and the interests of the public precludes
some more fundamental critiques that aim to investigate whether
society can realize the goals of the copyright system without the most
harmful effects of exclusivity. Instead, we need a critical theory to
232.

Drassinower, supra note 20, at 1873.
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and
escape the perpetual opposition of utilitarian-economic
authors-rights approaches. 233
A view of progress that foregrounds access to expression,
cultural flow, and the ordinariness of creativity opens up the
possibility that culture is not zero sum-that increases in access do
not have to come at the expense of the creation of new works.
Through this reconstituted view of progress, a new model can identify
the specific functions that the exclusive rights play and the harms
they try to avoid. Critically questioning the continued necessity of
exclusivity requires disentangling and directly addressing at least
three distinct issues that have long been bound up in copyright's
First, a better model of what
differing ideological justifications.
fairness requires in terms of remuneration and reward for creative
This point is crucial to any discussion of the
labor is necessary.
schemes and
normative desirability of alternate-compensation
nonexclusive funding models for the creative industries.
Second,
copyright theorists should develop a better empirical understanding of
whether commons models and other pragmatic solutions to the public
goods problem can convincingly provide adequate support to
professional creators to enable the continued production of a
sufficiently diverse culture. Third, it is necessary to identify when, in
what contexts, and to what extent exclusivity may be required to fairly
protect the nonpecuniary interests of authors. Models of abundance in
cultural expression provide great promise, but until proponents can
address each of these issues, any critique of exclusivity is likely to fail.
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Anne Barron, Copyright Infringement, 'Free-Riding' and the Lifeworld, in
COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 93, 127 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008)
("[Tihe hegemony of economic analysis within scholarly commentary on copyright law can only
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